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1Introduction 
 
“The causes of the currency crises in emerging markets during the late 1990s 
have been the subject of much debate—especially considering that, before the 
crises, many of the Asian countries tended to have balanced budgets and 
generally sound macroeconomic performance. …Some observers argue that given 
the generally favorable macroeconomic conditions, that the crises were not 
caused by incompatibility between fiscal and monetary policies and exchange rate 
pegs, but rather by the unexpected and self-fulfilling panics of foreign investors.” 
 
Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco:  Economic Letter 
 
Although most policy-makers encourage the opening of financial markets to 
foreigners, foreign portfolio investment, or ‘hot money,’ seems to be perceived in a very 
negative light.  Its short-term nature seems to be blamed for almost every economic ill 
when it comes to crises and to well-publicized disputes such as that between former 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed and financier George Soros.  It is 
further often compared to its much more stable and longer-term global capital flow 
counterpart, foreign direct investment and found lacking.  If countries have opened their 
borders to foreign investors and maintained a dearth of capital controls, it would seem 
intuitive that there exist at least some positive attributes to this form of private capital 
flow.  Indeed, a publication of the International Finance Corporation states the following: 
“In many markets, relatively small amounts of foreign capital have been 
enough to act as a catalyst.  …Foreign [capital] entry typically has set off two 
parallel virtuous cycles.  First, an institutional development cycle.  International 
investors—and, by proxy, the managers of their funds—demand high standards in 
regulation and information.  Spurred by the prospect of new investment, market 
regulators often undertake reform as part of the opening-up process.  In addition, 
fund managers require local services, such as brokers, custody and transfer 
agents, and information on local companies.  In response to this demand, local 
providers spring up, competition increases and standards improve.” 
 
Viewpoint, The World Bank Group 
2In this paper, I strive to understand better the impact of foreign portfolio 
investment and whether there exists a positive impact of foreign portfolio investment.  
Specifically, in the first chapter, I examine whether foreign portfolio investment, or ‘hot 
money,’ eases the financial constraints of small firms.  I further examine which route this 
impact takes:  a direct route, through the capital markets, or an indirect route, through 
bank lending.  Finally, I examine whether this impact ultimately leads to growth at the 
firm level.  Due to the information asymmetry and agency costs associated with foreign 
portfolio investment (also referred to as FPI), it isn’t immediately obvious whether small 
firms would be able to access this additional source of financing.  In the second chapter, I 
examine how the instability of foreign portfolio investment impacts the financial 
constraints and whether this impact destroys the benefits of foreign portfolio investment 
with regard to access to finance and ultimately, the growth of small firms.   
Given the recent emphasis in literature on global cash flows and access to finance, 
this study may find an audience with those that follow this area of financial literature 
such as advocates of liberalization and policy makers.  Small firms that have access to the 
public capital markets, as well as organizations whose intent it is to support small firm 
vitality may also be interested. 
I find that financial constraints are eased by foreign portfolio investment for small 
firms in nations with more developed property rights (also referred to as DPR nations), as 
demonstrated by an increase in the probability that such a firm in need of financing issues 
capital when there is an increase in foreign portfolio investment in its domicile nation.  I 
also find evidence that small firms in nations where property rights are less developed 
(LDPR nations) are helped by foreign portfolio investment as demonstrated by a 
3significant increase in the probability of issuing capital.  Conditional on a firm reaching 
the capital markets, the probability of equity issuance is negatively associated with an 
increase in foreign portfolio investment for small firms.  These results, coupled with 
evidence of an increased access to capital provided by foreign portfolio investment, 
imply that the form of capital for the small firms that access it is debt.  The route that 
foreign portfolio investment takes to ease the financing constraints of small firms in DPR 
nations is primarily direct, as seen through the increased probability of capital issuance 
and only very weak evidence of an indirect route, as seen in a modest increase in the 
liquidity of bank balance sheets combined with a decrease in the level of domestic credit 
provided.  The positive impact of foreign portfolio investment on access to finance, either 
directly or indirectly, translates into growth for small firms in only those nations with 
more developed property rights (DPR), which underscores the importance of an attractive 
investment climate and growth-nurturing financial development in a firm’s domicile 
nation.     
With regard to FPI volatility, I do not find evidence that the volatility of foreign 
portfolio investment (also referred to as FPI) - examined without distinguishing terms of 
relative confidence in a country (or country “creditworthiness”), as measured by a rating 
by institutional investors - is damaging to small firm access to finance, as measured by 
the probability of public capital issuance.  This is true regardless of the development of 
property rights.  Once examined in subsets of “investment grade” and “noninvestment 
grade” country years, a proxy for the level of confidence institutional investors have in a 
country’s distance from crisis, and controlling for the level of foreign investment, I find 
that small firm access to finance in countries is only significantly negatively associated 
4with the volatility of FPI in the noninvestment grade subset.  Importantly, I also find that 
the volatility of foreign portfolio investment only hinders the growth of small firms only 
when nations are deemed less ‘creditworthy’ or closer to crisis.  These results imply that 
the benefits derived from FPI such as increased liquidity and an enhanced investment 
environment (Levine and Zervos (1996)) through better corporate governance, investor 
protection and transparency (Feldman and Kumar (1995)), which have been linked to an 
increased level of access to finance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney 
(2000) – henceforth these authors are referred to as LLSV) and to more efficient 
allocation of capital (Wurgler (2000); Love (2001); Rajan and Zingales (1998)), are not 
depleted in times when country risk is deemed low enough in nations where investors are 
protected.  This finding is striking given the fact that volatility is actually larger on 
average in those countries considered investment grade.  
The papers most related to mine are Harrison, McMillan and Love (2004) 
(henceforth these authors are referred to as HML) and Laeven (2003).  Although similar 
in intent, these papers differ from mine on many dimensions.  HML (2004) focuses on 
the impact of foreign direct investment1 and examines this capital flow as a proportion of 
all investment, controlling for the proportion of total investment rather than the size of 
the market in question.  Laeven (2003) examines the impact of liberalization or reform 
policies on financial constraints rather than the specific cash flows resulting from said 
reformation.  These papers also differ from mine with regard to methodology.  Both 
 
1 Foreign direct investment is defined by the IMF (Balance of Payments Manual (1993)) as inflows of 
investment including short-term and long-term equity capital and reinvestment of earnings for the purpose 
of acquiring a lasting management interest in a foreign company.  Foreign portfolio investment is defined 
by the IMF (Balance of Payments Manual, 1993) as equity and debt issuances including country funds, 
depository receipts and direct purchases by foreign investors of less than 10% control. 
 
5papers focus on the result of financial constraints (i.e. investment sensitivity to cash) 
whereas I look to the source of the financial constraints, capital markets and bank credit.  
Utilizing the Euler equation, these papers examine implied external financial constraints 
instead of more direct evidence - capital issuance, or the lack thereof.  External financing 
(i.e. issuing equity and debt) can be used to finance investments and is in fact used when 
firms are financially constrained.  As such, evidence of this form of financing should be 
considered when examining financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)).  
In fact, the type of security issued can be indicative of the level of financial constraint a 
firm faces (Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson (1996) - henceforth these authors are 
referred to as CHH).  Importantly, these papers differ from mine with regard to their data.  
Both HML (2004) and Laeven (2003) utilize the Worldscope database.  Inasmuch as my 
emphasis is on small firms, I create a unique database of over 195,000 observations and 
across 53 countries to circumvent the larger firm bias from which many existing 
international databases suffer.  Given the considerable differences across focus, 
methodology and scope, it is difficult to compare results of these papers with mine.  
HML (2004) find that foreign direct investment as a proportion of overall investment 
alleviates financial constraints and that foreign portfolio investment as a proportion of 
overall investment does not.  Although arguably these results are in contradiction with 
my results superficially, the differences in small firm focus, data and definition of foreign 
portfolio investment leave room for differences in these results and consequently are not 
directly challenged by my results.  Laeven (2003)2 finds that liberalization alleviates 
financing constraints.  Although the scope of his research question is significantly 
 
2 Samak and Helmy (2000) provide a very thorough analysis of foreign portfolio investment in Egypt but is 
not a true empirical work so is not considered a related paper. 
6different, my results are not in disagreement of those of Laeven (2003) inasmuch as I 
provide results specific to property rights development subsamples, which can be loosely 
compared and whose results provide additional support to those of Laeven (2003). 
This paper contributes to three main areas of literature.  The first is small firm 
access to capital.  As markets become more integrated, foreign portfolio investment is a 
potential source of new investment capital for these financially constrained (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) – henceforth these authors are referred to as 
BDM) firms.  Information as to whether this additional source of capital for small firms is 
feasible given the information and agency environments is useful in extending this 
literature. 
This work is also related to the literature on global capital flows.  As more and 
more countries consider reforming foreign investment policy to enable capital market 
integration, this area of research becomes a resource for many.   
Lastly, this research touches on that of liberalization.  Although, not a study on 
liberalization, this paper offers insight into the impact of one potential factor in a 
country’s investment environment, foreign portfolio investment.  Capital market 
liberalization opens country borders to foreign investment, which may ultimately broaden 
and deepen financial markets but can also open countries to vulnerability to the fickleness 
of foreign investment.  Understanding what drives the aftermath of liberalization, such as 
the impact of a change in foreign portfolio investment, may offer insight into the debate 
on liberalization. 
7Chapter 1:  Can Foreign Portfolio Investment Bridge the Small Firm 
 
Financing Gap Around the World? 
 
I.  Motivation  
A.  The Challenges of Small Firms 
According to a report of the President on the state of small business for the year 
1999-2000, small businesses3 represent 99% of all businesses, employ half of those 
Americans who are gainfully employed and create two-thirds of the job openings that 
occur in the United States.  Other countries have a similarly large proportion of total 
firms represented by the small firm (Klapper, Sarria-Allende and Sulla (2002)).   These 
firms often face a lack of liquidity (BDM (2002); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and 
Maksimovic (2003)) and an excessive sensitivity to government regulation that could 
result in premature failure (BDM (2005); Tewari and Goebel, (2002)).  Accessing public 
equity capital is generally even more difficult for small firms (CHH (1996)).  When it can 
be, it is more expensive for the small firm relative to large firms (Warner (1977); Smith 
(1977)).  The size-bias small firms face from potential investors is one of the main 
challenges facing these firms.   The cumulative effect of these challenges is called a 
“finance gap” (Macmillan Committee (1931); Wilson Committee (1979)) and reflects the 
lack of capital available to these informationally opaque firms (Berger and Udell (1998)). 
 
3 Small firms here are defined by the Small Business Administration as any firm that does not exceed at 
least one of the following: 1) 500 employees for most manufacturing and mining industries, 2) 
100 employees for all wholesale trade industries, 3) $6 million for most retail and service industries, 4) 
$28.5 million for most general & heavy construction industries, 5) $12 million for all special trade 
contractors or 6) $0.75 million for most agricultural industries 
8Looking to the international capital markets for funding does not necessarily 
make matters much better for the small firm.  Beyond the same biases facing them in the 
domestic market, small firms face challenges from international capital sources for 
several reasons – most notably, supply.  Increasing the supply of capital, either 
domestically or internationally, could at least in part remedy this situation.   
 HML (2004) find that global capital flows are associated with a reduction in the 
financing constraints of firms.  As an increasingly vital part of global capital flows (see 
figure 1), foreign portfolio investment helps to increase financial development thus 
furthering the cause of decreasing financing constraints (Love (2003)) and more 
specifically, enhancing the development of markets (Levine and Zervos (1996)), which 
affords firms more opportunities to raise external capital (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998)).  Perhaps most important for this analysis is the fact that the 
competition for these cash flows motivates an improvement at the firm level in such 
things as transparency, disclosure and corporate governance (Bekaert and Harvey (2003); 
Evans (2002); Levine and Zervos (1996); Feldman and Kumar (1995)), which is 
particularly important for those investors looking to invest internationally (Aggarwall, 
Klapper and Wysocki (2003)).  The financially-constrained small firms striving to 
capture some of this additional source of capital have an even greater incentive to do so.   
B.  The Path of Investment 
Small firms tend to be partially dependent on bank lending to finance their growth 
(Warner (1977); Cull, Davis, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2004) – henceforth these 
authors are referred to as CDLR).  A portion of small firms reaches the capital markets 
and may use public financing to grow their businesses.  Those who do go public may still 
9rely at least in part on bank lending to finance their growth. As such, there are two ways 
in which foreign portfolio investment may reach the small firm: the ‘direct’ route - 
through the capital markets, and the ‘indirect’ route - through banks who will in turn 
invest in or be able to extend more credit to these small firms (see Figure 2). 
B.1  The ‘Direct’ Path of Investment 
 If competition for a scarce resource, such as capital, improves the investment 
environment through superior transparency, disclosure and/or corporate governance – an 
effective improvement in the investment environment, the set of firms in which foreign 
investors consider investing is increased to include some firms who previously had 
difficulty obtaining financing due to information asymmetry and/or agency costs.  This 
implies an improvement in the allocation of capital which has been associated with 
market development (Wurgler (2000)).  Small firms with their informationally opaque 
nature may be included in this marginal group of firms.  This is relevant due to the 
challenge of small firms in accessing capital in any form.  Firms perceived as ‘investible’ 
who need external financing should realize an increased probability of domestic capital 
issuance with an accompanying increase in foreign portfolio investment.  An increase in 
the probability of capital issuance stems from the increase in supply of capital and is not 
identified as due to foreign or domestic investors.  I examine whether the level of foreign 
portfolio investment helps to ease the financial constraints of small firms.  More 
explicitly stated, 
H1a) The probability of capital issuance for small firms is significantly positively 
related to the level of foreign portfolio investment of a country (e.g. the financial 
constraints of small firms are relaxed).   
 
10
 
Beyond whether a firm issues, I examine the type of security a firm issues.  
Inasmuch as small firms are typically debt-laden (CDLR (2004)), the ability to issue 
equity could be perceived to be a greater alleviation of financing constraints since there 
are no fixed payments associated with this form of capital.  This ‘choice’ of capital form, 
therefore, becomes informative.  Not much has been written in the international arena 
examining the feasibility of capital choice for constrained firms.  Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003) provide an examination of capital structure choice for both financially constrained 
and financially unconstrained firms in the United States.  Although solely a domestic 
study, the main result in Korajczyk and Levy’s work is that constrained firms issue what 
they can when they are able.  There isn’t any compelling reason, beyond an increased 
disclosure and governance at the firm-level, that would lead us to believe that these firms 
would be able to access equity as a result of the increase of the supply of capital available 
to firms, domestically or internationally.  We should see that although small firms will 
indeed see an easing of their financial constraints, this easing would mainly be in the 
form of debt capital4. To that end, I hypothesize the following: 
H1b) Conditional on firms issuing capital, the probability of small firms issuing 
equity capital will not be significantly positively related to foreign portfolio 
investment. 
 
B.2  The ‘Indirect’ Path of Investment 
For those firms who are dependent on bank lending and/or remain unable to 
access publicly issued securities, the ‘direct’ path of foreign portfolio investment is 
irrelevant.  An ‘indirect’ path through financial institutions instead is relevant.  The 
theory behind this path of investment stems from the bank-lending theory of monetary 
 
4 Also see Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004). 
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policy (Bernanke and Blinder (1988); Kashyap and Stein (1995); Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein (2002)).  Kashyap and Stein (2000) is particularly relevant in that they find that 
small banks are particularly sensitive to monetary policy.  This is relevant since small 
banks are most likely to be the banks to serve small firms.  The lending theory finds that 
money supply tightening (expansion) appears to decrease (increase) the ability of banks 
to loan funds based on the relative illiquidity of their balance sheets.  What this implies is 
that if there is a positive money shock into a country, bank balance sheets become 
relatively more liquid thus enabling them to increase the amount of credit extended to the 
public.  Although this money supply augmentation is due to monetary policy in Kashyap 
and Stein’s paper, this theory could be extended to consider a different source of ‘money 
supply’ – in this case foreign portfolio inflows.  An increase in the liquidity of the bank’s 
balance sheet through increased outside investment enables banks to lend in the same 
manner as if there were a change in money supply caused by monetary policy5. More 
concisely stated, 
H2) The liquidity of bank balance sheets, as well as the amount of domestic 
credit, are significantly positively related to the level of foreign portfolio 
investment of a country.   
 
C.  Foreign Portfolio Investment as a Derivative of Growth  
Although it is informative to know whether foreign portfolio investment increases 
small firm access to finance, it is at least equally important to know whether that 
additional access to finance helps the firm to grow.  Assuming the investment 
environment is sufficient to nurture small firm growth and foreign investment in general 
(as is the case in nations with developed property rights); we would expect this to be the 
 
5 This can be through investment in the banking sector or due to the implications increased money supply 
12
 
case.  In other words, if the property rights of a nation support investment sufficiently 
that small firms may realize less financial constraint; the additional access of capital 
provided by FPI should translate into firm growth. According to Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2003), the integration of capital markets leads to local financial development, 
and ultimately to small firm growth.  In this context, it could be inferred that to the extent 
that an increase in foreign portfolio investment coincides with the integration of capital 
markets we would expect the small firms to grow at a rate closer to their unconstrained 
growth rate.  To examine whether that in fact is true, I test whether foreign portfolio 
investment helps small firms to grow.    
Empirically tested this becomes,  
H3)  The growth rate of small firms, as defined by the percentage change in total 
assets (and separately sales revenue), is significantly positively related to the 
level of foreign portfolio investment of a country in DPR nations.   
 
II. Methodology 
A.  To Issue or not to issue 
Inasmuch as my goal is to examine the impact of FPI on small firm financing 
constraints, I utilize the findings of BDM (2005) and assume that all small firms are 
financially constrained.  As such, I limit my sample to small firms, as defined by the 
bottom tercile of firms ranked by total assets6. In so doing, I assume that any firm-year 
where capital issuance does not occur represents financial constraint.   
The results of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity for foreign portfolio 
investment demonstrate that endogeneity is a concern.  In support of this evidence are the 
 
has on the ability of banks to raise reservable forms of finance. 
6 Size terciles are created annually within countries so that firms are allowed to move into and out of size 
categories. 
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results of Agarwal (1997), which shows that the significant determinants of foreign 
portfolio investment are the (change in the) real exchange rate, share of the domestic 
capital market in the world capital market and some proxy for economic activity.  As 
such, I utilize an instrumental variable methodology that in the first stage regresses total 
foreign portfolio investment (average across years t-3 through t-1) on the above variables 
with relative interest rates (country interest rates scaled by world interest rates) serving to 
explain the economic activity and add to this list liberalization and FPI volatility to 
predict foreign portfolio investment with its significant determinants.  The reason behind 
the additional variables is based on much of the liberalization work down by Bekaert and 
Harvey, Henry, and Patro and Wald7. The first stage regression then becomes: 
FPIj,t = ?0 + ?1AFXRatej,t +  ?2Sharej,t + ?3RelIntRatesj,t + ?4Libj,t + 
?5FPIVolj,t +  t + E (1) 
 
To discern the impact of foreign investment on access to capital (as proxied by the 
probability of capital issuance), I divide the sample into halves based on property rights.  
Controlling for country and industry fixed effects, as well as firm-level capital structure 
choice determinants (such as cash flow, debt/asset level, profitability, risk, growth, and 
asset tangibility) to ensure that my results determine the extent of the access firms 
possess to issue necessary external capital (versus discretionary choice), I isolate the 
impact of foreign portfolio investment on the ability of firms to access capital.  Why the 
“potentially”? If it is not significant in DPR countries you would not expect it to be 
significant n LDPR countries. If it is that calls for more set-up at this stage. Empirically, I 
use an instrumental variable probit model wherein I first instrument the foreign portfolio 
 
7 See Bekaert and Harvey (2003), Henry (2000; 2003) and Patro and Wald (2004). 
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investment flows (scaled by gross domestic product) and in a second stage estimate the 
impact of these flows on the ability of small firms to access capital.  The probit 
methodology is used due to the limited nature of the dependent variable and the panel 
format of the data.  The dependent variable in this model is the probability of capital 
issuance (i.e. occurrence of issue:  y = 1; no capital issuance:  y = 0). 
Prob(y=1)i,t = F0 + F1FPIj,t-1 + F 2 Yj,t-1 + F 3 Xi,t-1 + Ii + t + E (2) 
where FPI is the predicted level of foreign portfolio investment from the first-stage 
regression (represented in equation (1)) in the instrumental variable probit regression (see 
equation (1) for the first stage), X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as 
cash flow, debt/asset level, profitability, risk, growth, and asset tangibility.  These 
variables control for occurrences wherein firms would be more likely to issue (Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003)).  Y is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
growth, levels of other potential sources of capital such as foreign direct investment and 
savings, and variables of development such as private credit, law and order and 
corruption levels.  Macroeconomic variables are calculated as three year trailing moving 
averages in order to abstract from business cycles.  This methodology is often used in 
cross-country analyses to smooth out annual fluctuations that can otherwise confound 
results (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) – henceforth these authors are 
referred to as BDL; Rousseau and Wachtel (2002)8).  I is a vector of industry dummies to 
control for industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time 
effect in the panel.  A description of the firm-, industry- and country-specific variables is 
 
8 See also Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2003). 
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in the data section as well as in the appendices9. The instrumental probit methodology 
utilizes weights frequency to avoid data cloning issues and a bootstrapping methodology 
which uses randomly chosen subsamples10 of the dataset with replacement to avoid 
dependence on assumption of the normality of distribution or the absence of stochastic 
influences on the data.  The bootstrapping technique is vital in ensuring that the standard 
errors are correct and that resulting significance is accurate.  Based on my hypothesis, 
H1, I expect T1 to be both positive and significant for small firms in DPR countries and 
potentially for small firms in LDPR countries. 
B.  Capital Choice 
The relevance of capital choice lies in its informative nature with regard to the 
extent of the relaxation of a firm’s financial constraints.  Due to the reliance of small 
firms on debt, the issuance of equity capital could be perceived as an increased easing of 
financial constraints.   
Inasmuch as the debt vs. equity capital “choice” implies that the capital issuance 
variable is positive (y=1 in equation (2)), equation (3) represents the second stage of the 
conditional logit model begun in the previous section. This model enables me to estimate 
the extent to which foreign portfolio investment alleviates financial constraints, since 
enabling small firms to obtain equity capital would not only meet their need for capital 
but also provide much needed financial flexibility by offering this capital without the 
fixed payments associated with debt. In the model illustrated below, the dependent 
variable represents capital choice, specifically y=1 for equity issuance and y=0 for debt.   
 
9 Tobin’s Q is not included in my analysis due to the sparsity and lack of consistency of information on 
market pricing in both less and more developed nations around the world.   
10 N=50 is used for bootstrap replication. 
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Prob(y=1)i,t = H 0 + H1FPIj,t-1 + H 2 Xi,t-1 + H 3 Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + E (3) 
where definitions of variables are as in equation (2).  Once again controlling for country, 
industry and time fixed effects as well as frequency of country observations and utilizing 
bootstrapping techniques, I ascertain the affect of foreign portfolio investment on the 
ability of small firms to issue longer-term capital.  Given that the vast majority of the 
additional capital coming into the financial markets is debt (Henderson, Jegadeesh and 
Weisbach (2004)) and the fact that these firms typically suffer from an inability to access 
equity capital (CHH (1996) ; CDLR (2004)), domestic or otherwise, I see no compelling 
reason that the probability of issuing equity capital would be significantly increased.  I 
anticipate that this coefficient, ??? will not be significant for small firms since these firms 
typically suffer from an inability to access equity capital, domestic or otherwise.  
C.  Domestic Credit 
 To address those small firms in my dataset that are at least in part reliant on bank 
debt, I examine the impact of foreign portfolio investment on domestic credit.  I examine 
the impact of foreign portfolio investment separately on two proxies of credit availability 
as well as a measure of bank balance sheet liquidity. Utilizing a cross-sectional time-
series of country-level data, I first regress the following: 
Debtj,t = I0 + I1FPIj,t-1 + I2Yj,t-1 + t + E (4) 
where Debtj,t represents two proxies (regressed separately) for the level of credit available 
in country j.  These proxies include the level of domestic credit available and the level of 
domestic credit available that is provided by banks.  If the implications of the bank-
lending channel are true in the case of foreign portfolio investment, the coefficient on 
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FPI, I1, will be positive.  Clustering at the country level is undertaken to avoid any issues 
of data cloning. 
Utilizing the same equation, I test the potential impact of foreign portfolio 
investment on changes in the bank balance sheet liquidity by utilizing a proxy for bank 
liquidity – Bank’s liquid reserves to asset ratio.  Empirically, this becomes the following: 
Liquidityj,t J0 + J1FPIj,t-1 + J2Yj,t-1 + t + E (5) 
Other definitions of variables are once again as they are in equation (2).  Additional 
variables included in Yj,t-1 are fiscal burden, based on the tax implications of credit 
(Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)), and relative interest rates, based on the cost of debt 
implications (Kashyap and Stein (2000)) on the demand for bank credit.  If foreign 
portfolio investment does increase the liquidity of the balance sheets of banks as the 
theory implies, we would expect to see a positive J1.
I also test the impact of FPI on bank credit at the firm level.  This provides an 
opportunity to examine how not only total leverage changes with levels of FPI, but also 
the maturity of the debt utilized by small firms.  Indeed, a decrease in the level of short-
term debt, a debt maturity upon which these firms most typically depend (Barclay and 
Smith (1995)), in favor of longer-term debt, i.e. an increase in the maturity of outstanding 
debt, would imply a reduction in financial constraints as longer-term debt involves less 
interest rate risk and provides capital over a longer term.  Utilizing a similar version of 
the regression in equation (2) that uses as its regressand leverage I regress the following: 
(Short-term/Long-term/Total) Lev i,t = L0 + L1FPIj,t-1 + L2Yj,t-1 + L3 Xi,t-1 + Ii + t + E (6) 
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where Levi,t refers to the amount of leverage (of each type separately) firm i holds in time 
t and all other variables are as they appear in equation (2).  Additional variables real 
interest rates and fiscal burden are used to control for capital choice as well as overall 
credit demand/supply issues.   L1 for short-term debt will be positive if access to capital 
has increased enough to reduce small firm dependence on bank lending.  If the contention 
that FPI helps to alleviate the financial constraints of small firms through an extension of 
the maturity of their outstanding debt is true, the coefficient on FPI in specifications 
using long-term and total debt as the regressand, L1, will be.  Frequency weights and 
bootstrapping techniques are once again utilized. 
D.  Growth 
To examine whether the direct or indirect route of foreign portfolio investment 
ultimately leads to firm growth, I utilize the growth rates of these firms, ascertaining 
whether foreign portfolio investment impacts their growth (both in sales and in total 
assets) by regressing the following: 
Growthi,t = N0 + N1FPIj,t-1 + N2Yj,t-1 + N3Xi,t-1 + Ii + t + E (7) 
where Growtht is the growth rate attained from year t  through year t+1.  All other 
variables are as defined in equation (2), frequency weights are included and 
bootstrapping techniques are once again utilized.  If foreign portfolio investment is 
beneficial to firm growth, then the coefficient of FPI, or N1, should be positive, reflecting 
in increase in the growth rate with an increase of the cumulative foreign portfolio capital 
flow of the previous three years. 
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III. Data 
I obtain my data for this work from the SDC Global New Issues database for the 
time period 1/1/1996 through 3/31/200311. Global new issues for all countries are not 
readily available proceeding this era in SDC.  Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), I 
exclude financial services due to the special circumstances of their asset base and utility 
firms (Macro Industry: Financial Services, Real Estate and Energy and Power) due to the 
abnormal stability and predictability of cash flow.  I also exclude those firms that have 
gone bankrupt due to the special set of issues that are included in capital structure 
determination when a company is failing12. This follows the methodology of Asquith, 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) who found that such situations generally cause a major 
restructuring of capital structure outside of the scope of financial constraint relaxation.  
Lastly I exclude IPOs.  Welch (2004) finds that the firms who undertake IPOs find 
themselves in unique environment, which contains a different set of issues than the post-
IPO period.  Including these firms would bias the results. 
I collect observations for common stock, non-convertible debt, convertible debt, 
non-convertible preferred stock and convertible preferred stock issued domestically only.  
The exclusion of international issuances is intentional due to endogeneity between 
foreign portfolio investment and international issues.  Financials for the companies 
issuing domestically are hand-collected from REUTERS.  This approach enables me to 
have a much richer sample of global new issues around the world of firms than afforded 
me by SDC Platinum alone.  REUTERS provides financial information on all publicly 
traded firms for the majority of countries in the world and as such does not suffer from 
 
11 Data before the beginning date of this period is sporadic. 
12 Firms going bankrupt would have additional difficulty obtaining capital, which would confound results.  
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the bias toward large firms to the extent that other international databases such as 
Worldscope/Datastream/Research Insight do. In fact, REUTERS even covers pink sheets 
and OTC/Bulletin Board firms whereas the others do not.  As such, the coverage is much 
more comprehensive (see figure 3).  The only firms not covered in REUTERS are those 
that have gone bankrupt or have merged with another firm.  The first group has 
deliberately been excluded from the sample as previously mentioned above.  The second 
group would only be a problem if the issuing company had acquired a firm in the sense 
that the capital structure control variables in these observations will have different 
relationships with the dependant variable than the remainder of the sample.  Due to the 
omission of these groups of firms, there exists some survivorship bias in my sample. 
Worldscope, Datastream and Research Insight are used to confirm accounting 
values and to append the sample where available.  The 31,929 observations represent 
issues of equity, debt (either convertible or straight), or preferred equity (either 
convertible or straight) and the relevant financial environment around which the company 
makes its decision regarding type of security to issue.  Including the time series of these 
capital issuances brings my sample to over 106,000. 
I further collect data on firms not issuing capital during this period of time to 
represent those public companies that either cannot issue capital or have sufficient funds 
internally.  For less developed country firm-year observations, I collect the financials for 
1996-2003 for the most exhaustive list of firms for each country as possible from 
REUTERS, collecting the exact same data utilized for the issuer dataset.  Developed 
country firm-year observations are collected from Worldscope, due to the inability of 
REUTERS to provide such large amounts of data given the fact that it is intended for 
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practitioners researching only a few companies at a time.  I believe this does not cause a 
bias due to the careful matching of accounting information.  Including these non-issuer 
firm-year observations, the number of observations in my dataset totals approximately 
195,000 firm-year observations. 
Seven countries out of the original 53 were dropped due to insufficient data13. In 
these cases there were only one or two observations of capital issuance, not enough from 
which to obtain any statistically significant results.  Two more countries (Taiwan and 
Bermuda) fall out due to insufficient macroeconomic data, leaving the sample number of 
countries to be 44. The exclusion of these countries decreases the sample size by 3294 
firm-year observations, which is less than two percent of the overall sample. 
Given the fact that there are over 24,000 firms in my sample, it is not surprising 
that the range of firm-level statistics such cash, leverage, profitability and risk is 
considerable.  Not surprisingly, small firms seem to have much more leverage than their 
larger peers (CDLR (2004); Rajan and Zingales (1995)).  Profitability and risk for the 
small firms are considerably larger, reflecting the higher growth rate of the small firms 
(and based on the fact that the figure is scaled by assets, controlling for size).   Market 
capitalization ranges from 97 (Bolivia – U.S.$MM) to 16600 (U.S. - $MM).  Annual net 
foreign portfolio investment scaled by gross domestic product ranges from –157M 
(Germany) to $437B (U.S.).  A full list of summary statistics for the dataset is provided 
in Table IA.   
[Insert Table IA here] 
 
13 These countries are Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, Papau New Guinea, South Africa 
and Bangladesh. 
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Descriptions, as well as sources, of both firm-specific and macroeconomic 
variables as well as definitions of financial data used in the analysis are provided in 
Appendix A.  Size, country development and geographic distributions for the entire 
sample, as well as correlations for the variables used in my analysis are provided in 
Tables IB - IF. 
[Insert Tables IB-IF here] 
A.  Firm-specific information 
Databases, such as REUTERS, obtain financials for these listed companies from 
the exchanges.  To the extent that these different exchanges in the different countries 
have different reporting requirements, financial definitions may vary.  Differences in 
currency value are avoided by using ratios, which will be comparable across countries.  
This is executed through a scaling by total assets unless otherwise noted. 
As many empiricists have attributed size as a determinant of capital structure, I 
assign size categories based on Total Assets. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) find a positive relationship between leverage and size.  Titman and 
Wessels (1988) find that size influences not only the extent of leverage but also the type.  
My proxy for this follows both Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and is calculated as total assets14.
Profitability of firms would be an obvious influence on firms inasmuch as this 
impacts how well a firm could either pay interest and/or dividends.  Titman and Wessels 
(1988) provide two measurements for this variable that are fairly applicable universally.  
They are operating income divided by sales and operating income divided by total assets.  
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I utilize both in my analysis but provide results for profitability based on sales only for 
the sake of brevity. 
Also relevant to capital structure determination is Asset tangibility.  This refers 
to how palpable the assets of a firm are and relates to capital structure concerns through 
its limitations on debt levels due to the ability to provide collateral.  A firm has less 
collateral the less tangible its assets are.  This, arguably, could be said to increase the 
probability of bankruptcy due to the inability to obtain funds when there are especially 
needed.  This follows logically from the fact that a company without material assets 
would not be able to liquidate to obtain the necessary funds to pay off debtors if it were 
necessary.  This variable is created by calculating fixed assets divide by book value of 
assets (following Rajan and Zingales (1995)).  Once again, within-country industry 
averages are used in those cases where there is missing data.  For the same reasons given 
above justifying the rationale for industry average substitution as proxies for uniqueness 
of assets, industry averages are suitable proxies here. 
Similar to profitability, the Growth of a firm impacts how well a firm is able to 
pay interest and/or dividends and is a typical capital structure determinant.  Proven to be 
an influential variable in capital structure (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Titman and 
Wessels (1988); Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993)), I include a proxy as calculated by the 
percentage change in total assets and also in sales revenue for a one-year term.   
To correct for any additional access a firm might have in other nations which 
might affect financial constraints (Lins, Strickland and Zenner (1999)) it is vital to 
include an indication of whether a firm has listings in other countries (i.e. ADR on a U.S. 
 
14 This is done annually so that firms may switch size groupings over years.  The analyses are also done 
using average size of the eight year periods.  As results are unchanged, they are omitted for brevity. 
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stock exchange).  Including a dummy variable for Crosslisting that takes on a value of 1 
if a firm is listed on an exchange outside of its nation of domicile and 0 otherwise.  I run 
equation 3 for a second time, this time including the crosslisting dummy to ascertain the 
impact in light of any additional sources of capital. 
B.  Industry information 
Differences in industry classification are avoided by using as industry indicator 
the SDC Platinum Macro industry code as my categorization.  An industry dummy is 
included to account for any industry fixed effects. 
C.  Macroeconomic information 
Based on results from such papers as Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999), Welch (2004), and Nejadmalayeri (2001) I include macroeconomic 
factors to capture their impact on capital structures in different countries.  All 
macroeconomic variables, unless otherwise stated are averaged over a lagged three year 
period to abstract from business cycle effects. 
 GDP growth is the percentage growth in gross domestic product per capita is 
included to control for the size and development of the country.   
To control for the impact of other potential sources of funds for firms I include 
both savings and foreign direct investment.  Savings is the calculated as the difference 
between gross domestic product and consumption.  Foreign Direct Inv., or foreign direct 
investment, is included to control for the effect provided by the more stable of the two 
global capital flows on capital issuance.  This is important given the fact that the impact 
of foreign direct investment is likewise beneficial for alleviating financing constraints 
(HML (2004)).  
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Controlling for the investment environment, I include Invest, Law and 
Corruption, which are indices reflecting the investment environment attractiveness, the 
level of legal development and the level of corruption (respectively) in a country by the 
International Country Risk Guide.  Including proxies for the extent to which a country’s 
investment environment attracts investors, that laws are developed and that the level of 
corruption existing in a country follows the methodology of BDM (2002) and BDL 
(2003), as well as many other examinations of access to finance in an international 
setting.   Papers such as Claessens and Laeven (2003) and LLSV (1997) point out the 
importance of investment climate as a determinant of financial development.    
 The variable of interest in this study, foreign portfolio investment, is included in 
its net form (inflows minus outflows) for the countries in the sample.  Actual levels of 
foreign portfolio investment scaled by the country’s GDP and are reflected in the variable 
FPI. These scaled values are use to illicit predicted values of scaled net foreign portfolio 
capital flows based on the work of Agarwal (1997). 
Instruments of the variable of interest are included due to the endogenous nature 
of foreign portfolio investment.  The variable Relative Interest Rates is included given 
the potential demand for foreign investment in certain countries based on the return 
available for investment relative to other countries providing implications on both 
domestic economics and international business (Samak and Helmy (2000)).  Share is 
included to address both timings of issuance that may occur (this is generally in more 
developed capital markets) or the decrease in the cost of equity and the resulting increase 
in the price of existing shares that theoretically occurs when market integration happens 
(Patro and Wald (2004); Henry (2000)).  Providing an additional determinant of 
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international trade/investment, I include 3FXRate, to provide a meaningful value 
indicator of capital investments (Agarwal (1997)).  The variable of interest in this study, 
foreign portfolio investment volatility, or FPIVol, is included in log difference terms and 
scaled by foreign portfolio investment levels for the countries in the sample.  These 
scaled values are use to illicit predicted values of scaled net foreign portfolio capital 
flows based on the work of Agarwal (1997).  Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) 
(henceforth these authors are referred to as BHL), Henry (2000), Patro and Wald (2004) 
and a host of other papers addressing the multi-faceted environment, as well as the 
impacts, of Liberalization. To control for these potentially confounding impacts of 
liberalization I include a dummy variable which takes on a 1 if it is included in the 
official liberalization dates of Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002) and/or Henry 
(2000) and a 0 otherwise.   
Analogous to Kashyap and Stein (2000), I use proxies for the level of bank 
lending to test the impact of an increase/decrease in the ‘money supply’ (in my case 
foreign investment).  Specifically, Domestic Credit from banks and Domestic Credit 
are utilized.  To test the other theory discussed in the aforementioned paper, the ‘balance 
sheet channel,’ I use the Liquid Reserves to Assets Ratio.  These variables serve as 
acceptable proxies for the theories mentioned and are used instead of firm-level data due 
to the lack of loan-level data available and provide a macro-level proxy of the same.  
Fiscal Burden, from Heritage Foundation is used to control for the tax implications of 
debt in these indirect route of foreign portfolio investment analyses.   This variable takes 
into consideration the proven relationship between taxes and lending in a multinational 
setting (Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)). 
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The basis of nation type for the analysis, Property Rights, is utilized to examine 
the ultimate impact of the importance of the development of the same.  It would seem 
reasonable that without developed rights and the availability of recourse, investors would 
not consider investing in risky firms, small firms ranking among the top of them.  This 
variable is chosen based on literature finding the importance of security law and investor 
protection such as LLSV (1997),(1998) and La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2004). 
D.  Data Correlation 
Table IF provides a correlation matrix for all of the variables used in the analysis.  
There are no notable significant relationships in the firm-specific data.  The only 
variables that exhibit any correlation are some of the macro variables.   The correlation of 
several macroeconomic variables is significant, which is generally an issue in many 
international studies.  As a result, empirical examinations using different specifications 
including select macroeconomic variables and the subsequent addition of problematic 
variables are executed to provide robustness to the results given the potential empirical 
biases based on correlation between the macroeconomic independent variables.   
[Insert Table IF here] 
IV. Results 
A. The Capital Issuance Choice 
The results of the analysis overall support the contention that foreign portfolio 
investment assists firms in easing their financial constraints.  Looking first to LDPR 
nations in Table II, we see that there exists a positive impact of foreign portfolio 
investment. Small firms in LDPR nations see a statistically significant increase of on 
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average 2.76% in the probability of issuing capital for a one percent increase in foreign 
portfolio investment.   
[Insert Table II here] 
In DPR nations, the impact of FPI is also positive and significant.  Small firms in 
nations with more developed property rights see on average a 0.922% increase for a one 
percent increase in FPI.  This figure is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically large – especially when one considers the fact that increases in foreign 
portfolio investment in the term I examine have been as much as 17% (Ireland in 2000) 
for these DPR nations.  It is worth mentioning that my results in these nations for foreign 
direct investment are counter to those found in HML (2004)15 where the sample 
examined includes larger firms.   The results using only small publicly-held firms finds 
that the relationship between foreign direct investment and capital issuance in DPR 
nations is instead one of a financial constraint increase.  The marginal effect on foreign 
direct investment for firms in these nations seems to be significantly negative, implying 
that form of foreign investment either crowds out small firms by entering into this type of 
investment only with large firms (De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2004)), or that any small 
firms that do enter into these types of financial arrangements do so as a substitute of 
capital issuance in the public markets.  Appealing to our intuition is the fact that domestic 
credit exhibits a negative association with capital issuance, demonstrating that bank credit 
is a substitution for accessing capital from the public markets.  Savings also exhibits a 
positive significant association with capital issuance demonstrating that this is yet another 
source of capital which provides liquidity for a nation. 
 
15 Performing the relevant analysis on the larger firms in my sample results in similar findings to that of 
HML (2004) 
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Importantly, I find that investment environment variables are influential in capital 
issuance.  Not surprisingly, supporting the findings of such papers as LLSV (1998), the 
development of law and order is positively and significantly related to access to finance 
in DPR nations.  Supporting LLSV (2000) is the positive and significant coefficient on 
corruption across property rights development.  The marginal impact is greater in LDPR 
nations implying that a larger benefit may be derived in improving access to finance in 
these nations with a corresponding decrease in corruption. 
Overall, firm-level variables, exhibit the expected marginal coefficients.  
Intuitively appealing is the fact that in DPR nations, variables such as leverage and cash 
are significantly positively related and risk and profitability are significantly negatively 
associated with capital issuance.  In LDPR nations there are fewer significant firm-level 
variables, suggesting that access to capital has less to do with these characteristics and 
more to do with country-level influences as well as infrastructure.  Leverage and cash are 
exceptions to this, exhibiting a significant positive and negative relationship with capital 
issuance respectively.   
These impacts, taken collectively imply that foreign portfolio investment reaches 
small firms in both DPR and LDPR nations directly through the capital market, 
effectively easing the financing constraints of firms who face difficulties accessing 
finance16.
B. The Debt/Equity Choice 
Examining the second step in the capital issuance process reveals many of the 
previously unearthed contentions in empirical corporate finance literature.  Indeed, I find 
 
16 These results are robust to clustering around industries.  These results are left out for the sake of brevity. 
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that in general, variables such as cash and leverage increase the probability of equity 
issuance, the former likely due to its evidence of liquidity and the latter supporting the 
contentions of capital structure theory.  Variables such as risk and asset tangibility 
decrease the probability of equity issuance the former supported by theory based on 
information asymmetry (see, for example, Barclay and Smith (1995)) and the latter since 
this proxies a sort of collateral, against which debt may be waged.  As these variables 
serve to provide control for extant literature and exhibit expected relationships with the 
dependent variable, they are left out of the tables for brevity. 
With regard to the variable of interest, Table III demonstrates that foreign 
portfolio investment, in general, does not seem to assist small firms to increase their 
probability of issuing equity.  In fact, the probability of small firms in DPR nations is 
virtually unchanged with a 1% increase in foreign portfolio investment.  This is not all 
that surprising when considering the inability of small firms to access equity capital in 
general.  Foreign investors would be no more likely to extend equity capital to 
informationally opaque firms than domestic investors, especially since the vast majority 
of the additional investment is in the form of debt (Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach 
(2004)).    
[Insert Table III here] 
Keeping in mind the significant impact of foreign portfolio investment on capital 
issuance for small firms in both DPR and LDPR nations, these results reflect the actual 
breakdown of the portfolio investments, i.e. debt versus equity.  Although foreign 
portfolio investment assists small firms in accessing finance, equity capital seems to be 
confined to larger firms.  This further supports the contention that small firms ‘take what 
31
 
they can get when they can get it’ since these debt-laden firms would most benefit from 
obtaining equity.  It is worth noting that evidence of an international extension of 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) is found in the coefficient on GDP growth in DPR nations.  
This negative and significant relationship with equity issuance supports their findings - 
specifically that constrained firms issue leverage procyclically. 
C. The Impact on Credit Availability 
 Statistically significant evidence consistent with an enhanced liquidity of banks is 
found in DPR nations (see Table IV).  The amount of domestic credit however, both in 
terms of banks and all financial institutions, is relatively unaffected by FPI in these 
nations.  Collectively, this impact demonstrates mixed results about extending the bank 
lending channel of monetary transmission (Kashyap and Stein (2000)) to money shocks 
generically.  The increase in the liquidity of bank balance sheets could imply that banks 
may be able to ‘risk shift’ their portfolio to include more risky holdings, potentially 
including more loans to small firms.  This effect combined with the results of Tables II 
and III wherein small firms in DPR nations are more able to access capital in general but 
less able to access equity capital given they are able to issue, suggests that these firms are 
able to obtain public debt from the capital markets and perhaps additional sources of bank 
credit since the banks that are more able to lend credit (given the very modest 
enhancement in credit levels) are the very banks lending to small banks (Kashyap and 
Stein (2000)).   The impact in LDPR nations is almost a mirror image to that in DPR 
nations - credit levels increase insignificantly while liquidity of bank balance sheets seem 
to decrease, also insignificantly.  These results are not surprising once we consider the 
volatility of these capital flows and the less supportive property rights and investor 
32
 
protection in these nations.  It appears that the same investment environment that limits 
the amount of foreign portfolio investment that enters a nation forbids any benefits that 
foreign portfolio investment capital flows might offer through the banking channel.   
Additionally, banks in these nations are often very closed to outside investors and 
corruption within this channel is omnipresent. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 Results at the firm level suggest that short-term and total leverage significantly 
decrease with an increase in FPI in DPR nations.  This supports the substitution effect 
and lends support to the notion that with enhanced access to finance, small firms would 
not be as dependent on bank lending.  Results in LDPR nations put forward a decrease in 
short-term debt but it is statistically insignificant, suggesting that these firms remain more 
dependent on bank credit.  The long-term debt, however, exhibits a significantly positive 
marginal effect whose magnitude is significant as well.  This likely complements the 
results in Tables II and III, which demonstrate that increases in FPI enhance access to 
finance through increased access to public debt instruments. 
 Collectively these results imply that foreign portfolio investment mainly flows 
through the capital markets.  Any impact through the indirect route of bank lending is 
very modest so that the results are seen mainly insignificantly.   
D. Growth 
 
Table V demonstrates the results of the analysis of foreign portfolio investment 
and firm growth.  Not surprisingly, factors such as cash stock, profitability and GDP 
growth play an important positive role in firm growth.  Leverage seems to enhance firm 
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growth in more developed nations only implying that debt in firm capital structures can 
be utilized as a tool for growth only in relatively stable environments.   
[Insert Table V here] 
The growth of small firms is found to be significantly positively associated with 
FPI in DPR nations only, as demonstrated by a statistically significant marginal 
coefficient of 1.297% for these firms.  It is important to remember that the cumulative 
effect given a substantial increase in FPI that can be achieved in these nations implies 
that foreign portfolio investment may provide a very real benefit for small firms in DPR 
nations with regard to growth.  A positive and significant coefficient on leverage in DPR 
nations (not shown) offers a nice explanation as to how this growth is achieved when 
coupled with the increased probability that small firms will issue debt should they issue 
capital.  Small firms in LDPR nations also see a significant increase in growth of total 
assets with a 1% increase in foreign portfolio investment of on average 2.56%.   
Growth enhancement in terms of sales revenue is only apparent for firms in DPR 
nations.  Small firms in developed property rights nations see an average 1.501% increase 
with a 1% increase in sales revenue growth.  Results for LDPR nations with regard to 
sales revenue growth compliment an IMF study that finds that foreign portfolio 
investment has not benefited growth at the country level in developing countries.   Some 
might argue that sales revenue is the more meaningful measure of growth since growth in 
total assets in not necessarily value creation (e.g. in the case of “empire building”).   
The significantly enhanced growth rates in terms of both total assets and sales 
revenue for firms in DPR nations are important in light of the controversy around foreign 
portfolio investment and its short-term nature.  Much of the literature demonizing this 
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tool of globalization has implied that the volatility implicit in this form of investment 
must ultimately be harmful for productivity.  At the firm level, this analysis casts doubt 
on this contention given a sufficient level of property rights is present.  This provides 
hope for small firms and should motivate top officials to increase the level of property 
rights in their domicile nations and to further encourage firm-level improvements in 
corporate governance/disclosure. 
V.  Robustness 
A. Financial Constraint Definition 
To provide an additional test of the impact of foreign portfolio investment on the 
financial constraints of all constrained firms, I need to first determine the external 
financing each firm needs.  BDM (2002) finds that firms seem to employ more long-term 
capital for growth in market-based environments. It is from this paper that I take my 
methodology for discerning financial need, or external funds necessary.  They derive 
their dependent variable from the “percentage of sales” approach to financial planning17,
calculating the external funds necessary.  I use a slightly different version of the same 
equation to estimate my need for external financing.  Based on these results, I further 
include proxies for both market and bank development.  The altered ‘external funds 
necessary’ (or EFN) is calculated as follows: 
EFNt = (At /St)(St – St-1) – (Lt /St) (St – St-1) – Mt (St)(RR)    (8) 
where At is the total assets of the firm in time t, St-1 and St are the sales of the firm in 
times t-1 and t respectively, Lt is the liabilities of the firm in time t, Mt is the profit 
 
17 Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also uses this methodology. 
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margin of the firm as defined by net income divided by sales for time t, RR is the 
retention ratio for the firm.  As noted by BDM (2002) several simplifying assumptions 
are made in order for this methodology to be implemented.  First, both the asset 
utilization (A/S) and the profit margin of the firm must remain constant per unit of sale.  
Further, the use of the formula to discern additional funds necessary depends on true 
values of assets being reported (relative to their depreciable basis).   
I adopt the Rajan and Zingales approach (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) to obtain 
unconstrained growth rates for the sample since using firm-specific information would 
imply that the resulting predicted growth rates would be optimal18. The growth rates of 
the relatively unconstrained firms in the US are mapped by both industry and size to all 
other countries and these observations are subsequently dropped from the analysis19.
Beyond industry matching, firms are matched by size due to the fact that small firms in 
countries with even the most developed property rights have difficulty accessing capital 
(BDM (2005); Koraczjyk and Levy (2003)).  This methodology avoids any downward 
bias based on access to capital and any bias for analysis on US firms after using these 
firms to obtain the unconstrained growth rates.   
Dropping those firm-year observations where EFN is negative and testing the 
primary hypothesis of the paper once again (H1) yields very similar results20 with regard 
to sign.  Magnitude of the impact seems to be enhanced considerably however for firms 
in DPR nations.  This would suggest that there were firms in the previous sample who 
perhaps did not need financing, diluting the effect such that magnitude was decreased.  
 
18 Rajan and Zingales examine inter-country differences between industries based on both macro and firm-
specific information 
19 This results in 52, 276 observations being dropped. 
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Small firms in LDPR nations unfortunately do not see the same enhancement, suggesting 
that relative to their larger counterparts, these firms do not benefit as much.  Table VI 
Panel A shows these results. 
[Insert Table VI here] 
B.  Measurement of FPI Flows 
Inasmuch as the portfolio investment cash flows given in this analysis are net (i.e. 
cash inflows minus cash outflows), an increase in foreign portfolio investment does not 
necessarily imply an increase in domestic investment.  To infer when foreign portfolio 
investment inflows increase, I test sub periods of the data.  IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (2001) reports the previously mentioned trend toward investment in 
emerging markets during the 90s and later the mass exodus of foreign investment capital 
flows changing the percent invested in developing nations from 65% to 9% (see figure 4 
and 5).  Foreign portfolio investment continues to grow but thus far this decade, it 
appears this increase in investment occurs in developed nations.  As such, I provide tests 
on time subsets of data for different market capitalization groups.  For less developed 
nations, I test equation (2) and (3) using the years 1996-1999.  For more developed firms 
I test the same equations over the term 2000-2003.  In so doing, the results remain.  Not 
surprisingly, they are even enhanced by this investment trend horizon for LDPR nations.  
This could imply that in these good times for hot money, small firms in these nations 
have a fighting chance to access capital.  Results may be seen in Table VI Panel B. 
 
20 Only approximately 25% firms dropped using this methodology issued at some point during this eight-
year term, compared with approximately 44% of firms with a positive EFN. 
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C. Interactions with Investment Environment Variables 
Examining the effect interactive effect of FPI with investment environment 
variables gives us a better idea of the cumulative effect of FPI on small firm access to 
capital.  Examining the implications of FPI interacted with these variables on the entire 
dataset (across firm size) offers further insight that investment environment is important.  
This should be fairly intuitive given the results of the vast literature by such authors as 
LLSV, Bekaert and Harvey and Wurgler.  The impact of FPI including investment, a 
variable that refers to a governments attitude toward foreign investment, is one that 
implies decreasing margin to return.  For those governments at the bottom of the index 
(invest=0), the marginal impact of FPI on access to capital is large – 1% for each percent 
increase in FPI.  For those governments already open to FPI, the marginal effect of 
becoming more open is less.  Those governments with that investment index equal to 
twelve, for example, would see only a 0.766% marginal benefit of FPI on access to 
capital. The impact of FPI given law and order is also important.  Although its 
magnitude is less than that of investment, it possesses increasing returns to scale.  Firms 
in nations where this index is low (law=1) can expect a 0.327% increase in access to 
capital with a 1% increase in FPI.  Those nations where law and order is more developed 
(e.g. law=6) will see a more impressive 0.707% increase.  Lastly, the impact of FPI given 
corruption seems to be quite influential.  The cumulative impact suggests that the impact 
of FPI in the presence of this variable is pivotal.  For example, looking to those nations 
where corruption is rampant, the cumulative impact of FPI is decidedly negative for firm 
access to capital -  (-)4.736%.  In those nations where corruption is well under control 
(e.g. corruption=6), the impact is equally large with regard to magnitude but this time 
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positive – (+)4.394%.  These results suggest that although all three investment 
environment variables are important, corruption levels within a nation can determine 
whether the marginal impact of FPI is positive or not.  Results may be found in Table 
VII. 
[Insert Table VII here] 
D.  Alternate Definitions 
Performing sensitivity analysis around definitions of key variables such as FPI  
and firm size, as well as altering sample country inclusion definition provides some 
robustness for the results.  To use another definition for foreign portfolio investment, I 
scale the net flow by gross private capital flows into a nation instead of the previous scale 
– gross domestic product.  This is the FPI variable utilized in HML (2004).  Instead of 
defining size annually, I instead use average size over the term examined.  To alter 
sample country inclusion specifications, I drop countries that may bias results due to 
changes in capital control policy or specific laws which may bias results such as in China, 
where only B shares were offered on the market for foreign investors during this term and 
foreign banking was not possible before 2002.   These countries include China, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Korea and Chile21. Performing these three specifications changes things 
only slightly.    
The utilization of the definition of FPI from HML (2004), scaling by total private 
global flows instead of GDP, proffers the main difference from previous results.  This 
point is brought out earlier in the methodology section of the paper and supports the 
 
21 Malaysia had capital controls until 10/1/1998 and South Korea was liberalized in 1998, which is two 
years after the first year of the examination period.  Chile initiated the encaje, which is legislation that may 
have had an impact on FPI levels and Hong Kong did not have FPI levels for part of the sample period. 
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reconciliation of the differences in results in this work and those of HML (2004).  
Overall, results remain similar and can be found in Table VIII.   
 [Insert Table VIII here] 
VI.   Chapter Conclusions 
Small firms play a distinctive and influential role in both the present and the 
future economic situations in which nations find themselves.  Financial constraints for 
these firms are exacerbated by both firm- and macro-level influences, and as such, 
additional sources of investment as potential additions to accessible finance are worthy of 
investigation.  Examining the importance of foreign portfolio investment in the capital 
issuance process, I find that foreign portfolio investment enhances the accessibility of 
investment capital through financial markets for small firms in countries across property 
rights development, but through the bank lending channel only in those countries where 
property rights are more developed.  Further, the enhanced access to capital for small 
firms only leads to significant value-enhancing growth in those nations that have more 
developed property rights.  The fact that small firms in nations with more developed 
property rights can look forward to enhanced firm-level growth with increases in foreign 
portfolio investment underscores the importance of investment environment 
fundamentals.  Improvements in a country’s foreign investment environment serve to 
increase the probability of financial constraint alleviation, for small firms in less 
developed nations.  
The positive influence of foreign portfolio investment on small firm access to 
capital supports the ideals of those who strive for optimal policy reformation in those 
nations who do not support foreign investment and whose markets are excessively 
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volatile or underdeveloped with regard to investor property rights.  Easing foreign 
portfolio investment restrictions on capital flows; stabilizing these investment cash 
inflows and improving the treatment of foreign companies and investors could have a 
very real influence on the longevity of the small firm. 
 
41
 
Chapter 2: Taking the Bad with the Good:  Volatility of Foreign 
Portfolio Investment and Financial Constraints of Small Firms 
 
I.     Motivation  
A. The Benefits of Market Integration 
 
Research done at the macro level shows that liberalization of investment 
regulations reduces the cost of capital in a country through capital market integration, 
increases capital flows such as foreign portfolio investment into the host country (Bekaert 
and Harvey (2003)), increases stock returns during the process (Patro and Wald (2004)) 
increases the liquidity and size of markets (Levine and Zervos (1996)), and leads to an 
increase in the real economic growth over a medium-term (BHL (2003)).  Focusing on 
the stock market impacts mentioned, the supply-side of capital increases, and the 
increased depth of financial markets caused by the level of foreign portfolio investment 
flowing into a financial market potentially eases the financial constraint of firms (Laeven 
(2003); Chapter 1)22, improves the allocation of capital (Wurgler (2000)) and importantly 
is often accompanied by improvements in transparency of accounting reporting and 
corporate governance (Feldman and Kumar (1995)).   
Importantly, the desire of countries, and the companies within them23, to “pull”24 
foreign portfolio investment to their economies motivates improvements in such things as 
 
22 See also Chari and Henry (2004) who find that the growth rate of a firm’s  capital stock exceeds that of 
its pre-liberalization rate. 
23 A McKinsey & Company Global Investor Opinion Survey (2002) finds that investors are prepared to pay 
a premium for companies exhibiting enhanced corporate governance standards.  This premium is on 
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corporate governance (Shinn (2000)) and investor protection/property rights (Bekaert and 
Harvey (2003)).  This in turn leads to increased investment (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (2002); Claessens and Laeven (2003))25 and a cycle of investment 
environment improvement ensues.  This cycle is longer-term in nature and is not likely to 
stop suddenly based on changes in the level of foreign investment. 
B.  The Costs of Market Integration 
The impacts of the influx of capital flows and capital market integration that 
occur in such events as liberalization, however, are not necessarily all good.  Bekaert and 
Harvey point out in their liberalization literature survey that liberalization, and the 
resulting increase in investment capital, may also have negative impacts.  These negative 
impacts are vastly due to the short-term nature of this capital flow - its volatility, and the 
potential to cause investor unease or panic.  This panic can either be a result of, or caused 
by, crisis within a country.  In contrast to the capital flow level, the variance of the flow, 
sometimes referred to as its instability, causes pressures on the money supply, exchange 
rates and stock market volatility26 27 of its host nations, making keeping tight reigns on 
economic policy difficult for governments and at times arguably increasing a country’s 
propensity for crisis or exacerbating the impact of an existing crisis.  Henry (2003) points 
out that crises such as those in Asia, Russia and Latin America have challenged the merit 
of capital-account liberalization.  Henry (2000) questions the permanency of the increase 
 
average 12-14% in North America, and Western Europe, 20-25% in Asia and Latin American and over 
30% in Eastern Europe and Africa. 
24 See, for example, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993); Claessens (1995); Claessens, Dooley and 
Warner (1995) 
25 The opposite effect is also true – see Aggarwall, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) for characteristics 
investors look for in foreign investment countries.    
26 See also Patro and Wald (2004). 
27 Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) however contends that this actually that the data do not support 
this. 
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in capital, suggesting that the increase in liquidity may only be temporary.  Henry and 
Lorentzen (2003) differentiate between liberalization with regard to equity and debt, 
stating the latter can be dangerous since it leads to a reliance on debt in the capital 
structure.  This is provocative given the fact that debt comprises about 90% of new 
capital issued internationally around the world (Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach 
(2004)).  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that banking crises are more likely 
to occur in liberalized economies.  This is relevant to small firm access to finance not 
only due to the frequency of twin crises, but also because crises in the banking sector 
could devastate small firms due to the fact that bank loans are the mainstay of their 
financing. 
Given that small firms are so very sensitive to macroeconomic conditions (BDM 
(2002); Tewari and Goebel (2002)), increased volatility could diminish any benefit 
achieved through the increased supply of investment capital.  Indeed, Samak and Helmy 
(2000) find in their examination of foreign portfolio equity investment in Egypt that 
maximizing the ultimate value of this form of foreign investment is dependent upon 
macroeconomic stability and a strong existing market infrastructure.  To complicate 
matters further, the areas that seem to have the most to gain from global investment 
capital flows such as foreign portfolio investment seem to enjoy these capital flows only 
accompanied by potentially damaging capital flow volatility (see figure 4 and 5).   
C.  Weighing the Impacts of the Capital Flows and its Volatility 
Whether or not the potentially damaging aspect of FPI, volatility, overpowers the 
benefits derived from the actual capital flow itself (e.g. increased liquidity, improved 
allocation of capital, improved corporate governance/investor protection/transparency) 
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which could ultimately reverse the enhanced small firm access to capital, depends upon 
the impact of FPI volatility on these benefits.  Investment environment improvements 
such as corporate governance, investor protection and/or transparency are put into effect 
because of capital inflow volatility and are supported by the company trying to obtain 
financing, government officials trying to attract foreign investment, foreign investors 
with a potential stake in their investment28 and official aid organizations such as the 
World Bank with the intent to decrease the volatility of capital flows.  Examples of 
government legislation requiring these improvements in disclosure/transparency as well 
as improved corporate governance in less developed nations are increasing29. These 
laws seeking to improve corporate governance and indirectly investor protection also 
seek to stabilize capital inflows, making it less likely to be positively correlated with FPI 
volatility or crisis.   Improvements of corporate governance at the firm level, induced by 
competitive forces for capital – both domestic and foreign - are not likely to be dropped 
by firms simply because their domicile nation is in crisis or that FPI becomes more 
volatile perhaps even leaving the country for a year or two.  In fact, this might induce 
firms to improve corporate governance measures such as board of director composition or 
disclosure even further, or at least to maintain the improvements already made to attract 
future foreign capital and to maintain or establish better access to capital domestically.  
The benefits of FPI may actually serve to ultimately decrease a country’s dependence on 
foreign investment by improving the investment environment enough to stabilize 
domestic investment which will eventually decrease the damaging impacts of the 
 
28 See Khanna and Palepu (1999). 
29 Korea has implemented a law requiring domestic companies to produce quarterly results.   China is 
switching from “cash” to “accrual” accounting.  Brazil has just legally limited the number of non-voting 
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volatility of these capital flows.  Assuming this is true, any potentially damaging effects 
of FPI could be attributed to “short run pain for long run gain30.” 
Although liquidity is more short-term in nature and would likely be impacted by 
volatility in the level of foreign portfolio investment, the positive impact of FPI would 
only be nullified if market liquidity reverses in the presence of FPI volatility.  This does 
not seem to be the case.  The liquidity of markets does not systematically decrease with 
FPI volatility, as is seen in figure 6.  In fact, the correlation between the two when using 
total value of listed securities traded as liquidity is a significant positive 0.505131. This 
correlation as well as studies that foreign investors do not destabilize markets any more 
than local investors (Dvorak (2001)) challenges the notion that market liquidity drops in 
volatile times (e.g. the flight of foreign capital)32. If the mechanisms by which the 
majority of the benefits of FPI with regard to small firm access to capital (see Chapter 1) 
is enhanced market liquidity, and volatility is significantly positively correlated with 
market liquidity in countries considered “investment grade,” as defined as periods when 
confidence in a country’s tranquility is higher than the sample median for that time 
period, it could be posited that FPI volatility does not destroy the enhanced access to 
capital small firms achieve coincidental to FPI flows.  
Given the lack of compelling evidence that FPI volatility damages or neutralizes 
the positive benefits of FPI along with the anecdotal evidence that liquidity may not be 
decreasing with volatility in all times, I contend that the volatility of FPI, as measured by 
 
shares a company can issue.  Mexico has created a law which precludes holding companies from gaining a 
controlling share of a company to force minority shareholders to sell at below market value.   
30 See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). 
31 Using percent of market traded instead of total value traded yields a significant correlation of 0.3902. 
32 See also Borensztein and Gelos (2001) and Karolyi (1999), who find that the herding of investors, which 
is often cited as the cause of the volatility of this capital flow, is not significantly different in crisis versus 
noncrisis periods.    
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the logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows scaled by a proxy for the size of an 
economy, gross domestic product (GDP), for the period t-1 through t-3, does not 
significantly decrease the access to finance of small firms in all times.  In periods when 
foreign institutional investors have more confidence that the country is relatively immune 
to imminent crisis (i.e. lower country risk), waves of foreign portfolio investment should 
not hinder small firm access to finance.  Tested empirically this becomes: 
H1) Controlling for the level of foreign portfolio investment, the volatility in  
foreign portfolio investment (scaled by the size of the host county) does not  
significantly impede small firm access to capital, as measured by the probability  
of capital issuance, in times of increased country confidence, as measured by an  
increase in the institutional investor rating.    
It is worth noting here the importance of the inclusion of the FPI level so that the 
impact of the volatility of the flow can be disentangled from the level itself.  Including 
this variable should enable the true effect of the instability of this capital flow to be 
uncovered.  Also relevant is the fact that volatility is scaled by gross domestic product.  
This is to address the fact that large developed countries such as the United States 
actually have a larger FPI volatility than smaller countries such as Peru, yet they are able 
to absorb such things often without negative implications.   
Bekaert and Harvey, Henry (2000) and Henry and Lorentzen (2003), papers 
described earlier in the motivation, point out the potentially negative attributes of capital 
flows such as increased pressure on money supply, exchange rates and market volatility, 
and mainly base these contentions on the volatility inherent in this short-term capital 
flow.  Given the potentially fickle nature of this capital flow coupled with the sensitivity 
of small firms to macroeconomic volatility (BDM (2005)), would an increase in FPI 
volatility impact the growth of small firms?  Even if H1 can not be disproved, and 
volatility increases the ability of these firms to raise capital in periods of enhanced 
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country creditworthiness/low propensity for crisis, is it ever good for small firm growth?  
Given the sensitive nature of small firms to macroeconomic factors, as well as the 
negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on small firm access to capital, it is likely 
that volatility has a negative impact on the growth of these firms.    
H2)  Controlling for the level of foreign portfolio investment, the volatility of  
foreign portfolio investment (scaled by gross domestic product) hinders the  
growth of small firms as measured by the log difference in both total assets and  
sales revenue. 
II. Methodology 
A.  Volatility in Foreign Investment 
To test whether the volatility of foreign portfolio investment, as calculated as the 
logarithm of the variance of foreign portfolio investment over years t-1 through t-3 is 
damaging to small firm access to capital, I divide my sample of 44 countries into subsets 
based on the creditworthiness of the country-year – “investment grade” for those country-
years more than the annual sample median Institutional Investor Rating and 
“noninvestment grade” for those country-years less than the annual sample median.  This 
is important given the fact that “shifts in international portfolio composition usually 
correspond to changes in perceptions of country solvency by international investors 
rather than to variations in underlying asset value (FitzGerald (1999)).  It is also 
important given the responsibility that investors are given for their role in crises.  The 
quote at the beginning of this essay from the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco 
points to the popular perception that investor panic causes crises - not asset value – thus 
investor perception of risk is an important factor in the potential downside of FPI.  
Inasmuch as sovereign risk is determined to be a leading indicator of crisis (Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) – henceforth these authors will be referred to as KLR), but 
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not a significant predictor of FPI values (Agarwal (1997)), concerns of interdependence 
between these categories and FPI volatility should be allayed.  Estimating the impact of 
sustained volatility on small firm access to finance, as measured by the probability of 
capital issuance (y=1 where firm i issues capital in time t and equals zero otherwise), I 
perform the following regression. 
Prob(y=1)j,t = ?0 + ?1FPIVolj,t-1 + ?2 FPIj,t-1 + ?3Xi,t-1 + ?4Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + E (10) 
 
where FPIVol is the predicted level of FPI volatility from the first-stage in the 
instrumental variable probit regression (see equation (11) for the first stage) and is 
calculated as the variance of foreign portfolio investment scaled by gross domestic 
product (GDP), FPI is the average level of foreign portfolio investment scaled by GDP in 
the period t-1 through t-3 (parallel to the volatility term), X is a vector of lagged firm-
specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, profitability, risk, growth, external 
financing necessary, asset tangibility and crosslisting.  These variables control for 
occurrences wherein firms would be more likely to issue (see for example, Korajczyk, 
and Levy (2003), BDM (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002)).  Y is a vector of lagged 
alternate sources of capital such as foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio 
investment, domestic credit and savings.  FPI, in particular, is added to distinguish 
between investment level/trend33. Macroeconomic variables are averaged over the years 
t-1 through t-3 to in order to parallel the volatility term and to abstract from business 
cycles.  This methodology is often used in cross-country analyses to smooth out annual 
fluctuations that can otherwise confound results (see BDL (2003); Rousseau and Wachtel 
 
33 Any concerns that interdependence between foreign portfolio investment flows and FPI volatility may 
drive results should be resolved by the fact that pairwise correlation of these two is once again below 10% 
and insignificant.   
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(2002)34).  I is a vector of industry dummies to control for industry effects and t 
represents time dummies, which control for any time effect in the panel.  A description of 
the firm-, industry- and country-specific variables is in the data section as well as in the 
appendices35. The instrumental probit methodology used implements frequency weights 
to avoid data cloning issues and utilizes a bootstrapping methodology, which uses 
randomly chosen subsamples36 of the dataset with replacement to avoid dependence on 
assumption of the normality of distribution or the absence of stochastic influences on the 
data. 
According to Agarwal (1997), the significant determinants of foreign portfolio 
investment are inflation, the real exchange rate, market capitalization and some proxy for 
economic activity.  Inasmuch as the actual capital flows are suffering from potential 
endogeneity issues, volatility of these capital flows will likely suffer the same.  
Supporting this contention is the statistically significant correlation between FPI volatility 
and other macroeconomic variables utilized in the analysis.  Since endogeneity of the 
volatility of foreign portfolio investment is a concern, I utilize an instrumental variable 
approach that in the first stage estimates FPI volatility and in a second stage estimates the 
regression in equation (10).  Robust standard errors are adjusted to allow for within firm 
correlation of observations and a two-stage approach.  I regress foreign portfolio 
investment instability (I define volatility in absolute, relative log difference terms, as well 
as the change in volatility to ensure robustness) on relevant variables, such as corruption 
based on the relevance found in Chapter 1, relative interest rates and liquidity, based on 
 
34 See also Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2003). 
35 Tobin’s Q is not included in my analysis due to the scarcity and lack of consistency of information on 
market pricing in both less and more developed nations around the world.   
36 N=50 is used for bootstrap replication. 
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work from Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and country sovereign risk as well as foreign 
exchange rate changes, based on work from KLR (1998) and Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003)37. The empirical model is as follows: 
FPIVolj,t = F0 + F1AFXRatej,t + F2Corrj,t + F3RelIRj,t+ F4ATVTj,t +
F5AIIRj,t + t + E (11) 
 
Performing the two-stage regression, I examine the impact of endogenously- 
determined FPI volatility on the probability of a firm issuing public capital.  Controlling 
for other influences in capital issuance, the relationship that exists between a finite 
change in volatility (increase or decrease) and the probability of capital issuance will 
offer support or help to reject the hypothesis, H1.  I expect this coefficient, W1, in equation 
(10) to be positive and significant for small firms in the investment grade sample.  Small 
firms in the noninvestment grade sample will likely exhibit a negative association with 
capital issuance due to the negative relationship between liquidity and volatility in these 
times and in regressions that don’t delineate between increased or decreased country risk. 
B.  Growth 
To examine whether the volatility of foreign portfolio investment ultimately 
hinders firm growth (H2), I utilize the growth rates of these firms (in total assets and in 
sales revenue) and whether that impact is disproportionate by regressing the following: 
Growthit = U0 + U1FPIVolj,t-1 + U2FPIj,t-1  + U3Xi,t-1 + U4Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + E (12) 
where Growthi,t is firm i’s growth rate attained from year t through year t+1.  All other 
variables are as defined in equation (10).  If foreign portfolio investment volatility 
hinders small firm growth, then the coefficient of FPIVol, U1, should be negative, 
 
37 All instruments are significant at the 1% level in this stage. 
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reflecting in decrease in the growth rate with an increase in the volatility of foreign 
portfolio investment volatility. 
III.  Additional Data 
 The collection and contents of the dataset utilized for this dissertation are outlined 
in Section III of Chapter 1 of this work.  Additional data necessary for this chapter are 
listed in this Chapter/Section.  Descriptions of all variables, for the cumulative work are 
available in the appendix. 
The liquidity of capital markets, proxied by Total Value Traded, is included to 
instrument FPI volatility.  This is due to the negative effect reduced market liquidity has 
on the confidence of foreign investors (Aggarwall, Klapper and Wysocki (2003)).    
The variable of interest in this study, foreign portfolio investment volatility, or 
FPIVol, is included in log difference terms and scaled by foreign portfolio investment 
levels for the countries in the sample.  These scaled values are use to illicit predicted 
values of scaled net foreign portfolio capital flows based on the work of Agarwal (1997). 
Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade are variables created to depict the 
environment within which investors find themselves.  This classification is created based 
on a rating of the creditworthiness of the country – the Institutional Investor Rating.
This rating is used by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) to infer the general 
impression of a country’s solvency with regard to foreign debt and has implications on 
how volatile short-term investment may be as a result of confidence (or the lack thereof) 
in a nation’s proximity to crisis.  The relevance of institutional investor’s impression of 
the solvency of country sovereign debt has also been mentioned in Samak and Helmy 
(2000) as an important factor in the “pull” of foreign portfolio investment to a country. 
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Lastly, I include Propensity for Crisis in the robustness section of this chapter.    
This is used as an alternative and perhaps more direct measure of a country’s proximity 
to crisis based on the works of Kaminsky (2003) and KLR (1998) which examines the 
timing and leading indicators of crises respectively. 
IV.        Results 
A.  Small Firm Access to Capital 
The volatility of foreign portfolio investment could theoretically pose a threat to 
existing investors via security values and the firms via asset values if and when capital 
leaves the country very rapidly in times when investor confidence is quite low, for 
example, in crisis periods.  This volatility, however, does not have to translate into a 
decreased level of access to finance if the short-term effects such as a decrease in 
liquidity does not outweigh the longer-term benefits of foreign portfolio investment that 
make this enhanced level of financing access possible, such as strides to improve the 
investment environment.  In support of that logic, Table IX displays an economically 
insignificant negative coefficient for small firms in all three samples – on average of 
0.012 – that is a 0.012% decrease for a 1% increase in the level of volatility.  Even in a 
multiplicative sense given probable swings in the level of volatility, this is a very small 
number.  Checking the coefficient on the control for the level in FPI, it is further apparent 
that the volatility coefficient (marginal effect) is not large enough to completely reverse 
the benefits of FPI.  In fact, it hinders it minimally when defining volatility in this 
manner.  Firm access to capital in the noninvestment grade sample is not even 
statistically significant, suggesting that volatility in these country-years is absorbed and 
goes relatively unnoticed.    
53
 
[Insert Table IX here] 
Using a relative measure of volatility as defined as the level of volatility relative 
to global volatility provides similar results.  Only the magnitude of the marginal effects 
changes, increasing to an average of 0.065, implying that it is the relative, rather than the 
absolute, level of volatility that matters with regard to the level of impact.  Having said 
that, the noninvestment grade sample (specification 3) is insignificant – this was not the 
case when using a straight-forward volatility definition.  This is perhaps due to the fact 
that when a country-year is deemed noninvestment grade, its volatility relative to other 
country-years is not as important as the fact that it is currently considered a bad 
investment.    
Looking to the change in volatility, it becomes obvious that changes in the 
variance of FPI net flows inhibits access to capital in general.  Both the economic and 
statistical significance of this negative association of FPI volatility perhaps speaks more 
to proximity to periods of crises and the confidence of not only foreign investors but also 
to domestic investors.  Increases in the level of variance suggest a much more volatile 
macroeconomic environment, one that would decrease the pool of “investible” firms by 
causing a flight to quality by investors to safe investments.  The marginal effect of the 
change in volatility on access to public finance is negative and significant across the 
board for this definition of volatility.  What’s more, the economic significance has 
increased to on average 0.127, implying a more significant effect once one considered the 
potential multiplicative effect of this coefficient given swings in FPI volatility. 
Alternate sources of capital demonstrate expected relationships with capital 
issuance (access to public finance).  Foreign direct investment has a positive influence on 
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capital issuance as does national savings.  Domestic credit, a substitute for public capital 
issuance, is negative.  Interestingly, the marginal effect of GDP growth demonstrations 
that firms issue counter-cyclically, when they are more likely to need external financing – 
in the investment grade sample.  Noninvestment grade, and to a certain extent, the whole 
sample, show a positive relationship with GDP growth and access to finance which could 
imply some type of capital rationing wherein firms only receive access to capital in better 
times.  Comprehensive results may be found in Table IX. 
B.  FPI Volatility and Firm Growth 
 Importantly, the results in Table X show that volatility may indeed be bad for 
small firm growth but it seems as if it doesn’t always have to be.  Perhaps surprisingly,  
we see that growth in the base specification (“all” times) for growth in total assets is not 
significantly negatively associated with an increase in FPI volatility and growth in sales 
revenue actually reflects a positive significant association with the same.  This is good 
news for proponents of capital market integration since it implies that FPI instability does 
not have to hinder firm growth, which in turn implies that it may not derail the economic 
growth that BHL (2003) suggest might ensue with this integration.  Corresponding nicely 
with the results in Table IX is the fact that growth in the investment grade sample, growth 
in sales revenue is positively impacted by FPI volatility.  However, it is not statistically 
significant.  The noninvestment grade sample seems to be the only specification where 
FPI volatility exhibits a significantly negative association with growth.  This impact is 
not surprising given the results for these firms in Table IX demonstrating a decreased 
probability of being able to access public financing in two of the three volatility 
definitions, coupled with the typically enhanced risk aversion of investors in these times.  
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The extent of this marginal effect relative to the benefits of FPI seems to be more 
significant than the effect on access to finance.  For growth in total assets in particular 
these marginal effects, although insignificant, demonstrate a potentially threatening force 
for these small firms.  Growth in sales revenue seems to offer a more pronounced effect, 
suggesting that this form of growth is more immediately reactive to cash flow, but 
reflects a much less threatening effect, offering some support to the contention that FPI 
benefits are not neutralized in the presence of its volatility.  Overall, these results should 
help to allay fears that volatility hinders these firms, at least in the short run.   
[Insert Table X here] 
 
V.  Robustness 
A. Alternate Definitions and Sample 
Performing sensitivity analysis around definitions of key variables such as FPI, as  
well as altering sample country inclusion definition provides some robustness for the 
results.  To use another definition for foreign portfolio investment, I scale the net flow by 
gross private capital flows into a nation instead of the previous scale – gross domestic 
product – and calculate the logarithm of the variance of the term t-1 through t-3 based on 
this definition.  This definition of FPI is utilized in HML (2004).  I also define FPI 
scaling by market capitalization.  Lastly, to alter sample country inclusion specifications, 
I drop countries that may bias results due to changes in capital control policy or specific 
laws which may bias results such as in China, where only B shares were offered on the 
market for foreign investors during this term and foreign banking was not possible before 
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2002.  These countries include China, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea and Chile38.
Performing these three specifications leaves the vast majority of the results in place.  The 
magnitude of the marginal effects is slightly altered but overall, results remain similar 
and can be found in Table XI. 
[Insert Table XI here] 
B.  Proximity to Crisis 
To address concerns that the volatility measure utilized does not capture fully the  
downside of FPI, I reexamine the data using a measure which captures a country’s 
proximity to crisis perhaps more directly.  Using the country-years depicted in Kaminsky 
(2003) as currency crisis years and BDL (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005) for banking crisis years, I create a dummy variable which takes on a value of one 
if a country is in either a currency or a banking crisis and zero otherwise.  The inclusion 
of the banking crisis variable is due to the frequency of banking crises and currency 
crises to occur simultaneously – the so-called “twin crises”  (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Zhu (2003)).   Using leading indicators of crises from Kaminsky, Lizonda and 
Reinhart (1998), I regress the following: 
Prob (y=1)j,t = V0 + V1FXRatej,t-1 + V2AIIR j,t-1 + V3NetCapAcct j,t-1 +  
V4Reserves j,t-1 + W (13) 
 
where FXRate is the real exchange rate, AIIR is change in the institutional investors’ 
Country Sovereign risk rating, NetCapAcct is the net capital account level, and Reserves 
is a country’s amount of reserves.  I perform this cross-sectional probit regression both in 
and out-of sample.   
 
38 South Korea was liberalized in 1998, which is two years after the first year of the examination period.  
Chile initiated the encaje, which is legislation that may have had an impact on FPI levels and Hong Kong 
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B.1 In-sample 
Looking at the in-sample regression first, the following regression is run.   
Prob(y=1)j,t = N0 + N1FPIj,t-1 + N2CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1 + N3FPIj,t-1 +  
N4Xi,t-1 + N5Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + E (14) 
where CrisisProp is the propensity for a country to go into crisis as defined as the 
instrumented value, or the first stage of a two-stage least squared regression.  All other 
variables are defined as previously in the paper.    
 Results from this analysis provide insight as to how the benefits of foreign 
portfolio investment deteriorate with an increase in a country’s risk of crisis.  The 
interaction term in Table XII shows that this impact is not surprisingly negative.  Taken 
collectively with the positive and significant effect of the FPI term implies that as the 
propensity for crisis grows large for country j, the benefit derived from FPI decreases.  In 
fact, this benefit is completely reversed when the propensity for crisis reaches only 24%.  
This fits in nicely with the volatility analysis since we see that all countries can be 
hindered by the volatility in this capital flow but not in all times.  Although the enhanced 
access to finance gained from this foreign capital flow falls with an increase in the 
propensity for crisis, a positive benefit is retained for most of the sample.  Indeed, the 
mean propensity for crisis in the sample is only 18.5%, indicating that this is not the case 
for the majority of the sample.  The results do indicate, however, that for those countries 
particularly sensitive to crisis, enhancements in access to finance may not be maintained 
if stability in these economies is interrupted. In fact, the effect seen in the interactive 
variable coefficient relative to the crisis propensity variable alone shows us that FPI 
 
did not have FPI levels for a portion of the examination period. 
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actually does exacerbate the effect of the crisis – as the popular press accuses.  Although 
this is not great news for advocates of market integration, it underscores the importance 
of a stable infrastructure and investment environment that will endure the challenges that 
currency and/or banking crisis offer an economy.  Recognizing that the definition of 
crisis in this examination includes banking crises and acknowledging once again that 
currency crises and banking crises may well occur contemporaneously, the banking 
sector, as well as financial markets, plays a large role in the stability maintenance of 
countries39.
Results regarding growth are similar supportive of earlier findings.  Looking to 
growth in sales revenue, the definition of growth that many economists feel is more 
valuable to the economy, we see that although FPI is positive and significantly related to 
small firm growth, its effects diminishes when combined with a nation’s propensity for 
crisis.  The sample average of 18.5% just nullifies any positive influence FPI has on 
growth.  Indeed, this positive influence is more rapidly negated than the influence on 
capital issuance.  This is not particularly surprising given the risk aversion during crisis 
periods and the reactions firms have with regard to their operations.   
[Insert Table XII here] 
B.2  Out-of-sample 
 Using estimates of propensity for crisis outside of the sample period instead of 
within, I examine the cross-section of the sample in each year, utilize the fitted value of 
equation (6) for the preceding four-year period (i.e. 1991-1995 for time=1996, 1992-1996 
for time=1997, etc.).   Doing so provides more detail in the results, which highlights the 
 
39 The inclusion of this variable also may bias upward a country’s propensity for risis making the actual 
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Asian Crisis and its contagion in the results.  Years other than 1998-99 offer very similar 
results to those in the in-sample analysis.  The two-year period of the crisis interrupts 
these relationships quite a bit.  The interactive term looses its significance, more than 
likely because a significant portion of the sample is either in crisis or influenced by crisis 
due to contagion.  Fitting in nicely with this is the fact that we see that the coefficient for 
FPI is actually negative here.  FPI provides value as long as a country’s propensity for 
crisis is not above the average for the sample – the significant difference between the 
variables of interest as well as the majority of the control variables demonstrates nicely 
how few macroeconomic factors aren’t affected negatively by crisis making the case that 
FPI is one factor among many that may lead to decreased access to capital when a 
country is in crisis.  These results may be seen in Table XIII. 
[Insert Table XIII here] 
VI.   Conclusions 
Although foreign portfolio investment serves a potential additional source of 
investment capital for small firms, the volatility of this capital flow in times of crisis 
threatens the benefits FPI provides such as an enhanced access to capital.  Importantly, 
the short-term growth of these firms seems to be relatively unaffected by the variability in 
this capital flow, except in those periods of decreased investor confidence (alternatively - 
in periods of higher country risk).  In these less “investible” periods, FPI volatility 
hinders the small firm when taking growth into consideration, implying that access to 
finance may be interrupted, and that the risk aversion that ensues with volatility in these 
 
point at which FPI’s benefits are neutralizes higher than 24%. 
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capital flows decreases benefits derived from it in these times through decreased 
liquidity. 
Results in this paper support the contention that volatility of capital flows is 
potential damaging to host economies.  Specifically, FPI volatility can interrupt enhanced 
access to finance for small firms through a reduction in the liquidity of financial markets.  
The results do not support the contention that volatility is harmful in all times, finding 
that waves of investment do not significantly decrease the probability that a small firm is 
able to issue capital in the public markets in times when investor confidence is increased 
and does not necessarily hinder firm growth in the short term.  A policy implication of 
this is that countries should try to stabilize capital flows by way of increasing institutional 
investor confidence in their nation.  Fortunately, having open borders to foreign investors 
goes part of the way toward that end, since liberalized nations see increases in both the 
size and the liquidity of markets, as well as improvements in corporate governance and 
disclosure.   
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Dissertation Conclusions 
 
Foreign portfolio investment has the potential to influence foreign investment at 
the country, firm and investor level to motivate actions which influence change to better 
the investment environment, which will in turn draw more investment.  The longer-term 
benefits of this capital flow such as improvements in corporate governance, and 
disclosure are not likely to reverse  based on fluctuations in this flow.  Shorter-term 
benefits of this capital flow, such as market liquidity, may reverse in the presence of 
severe fluctuations.  These fluctuations and the resulting decrease in liquidity may serve 
to lessen or negate the benefits of the capital flow itself.  Results of examinations of both 
the capital flow and its volatility imply that although the benefits of foreign portfolio 
investment may be potentially economically large and worthy of market integration, the 
instability has the potential to destroy the benefits initially derived by the capital flow.    
 Based on the results of this study, policy implications are that countries that wish 
to benefit from foreign portfolio investment should strive to improve property rights and 
investor protection such that confidence in these countries reaches a level which is 
minimum for investors to remain when macroeconomic changes occur.  In the end, 
policies that will minimize volatility while still allowing for the benefits of foreign 
portfolio investment may be put into place to begin a beneficial investment cycle that will 
improve foreign investment and domestic financial development for the long run.
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Table IA Summary Statistics 
Cash is defined as cash and/or marketable securities scaled by total assets. Leverage is total liabilities 
scaled by total assets. Asset tangibility is defined as fixed asset divided by the book value of total assets. 
Profitability is defined as operating income divided by sales. Risk is defined as the standard deviation of 
the firm’s profitability ratio over the previous three years. Crosslisting is a dummy variable which takes on 
a value of 1 if a firm is crosslisted. Growth in total assets/sales is defined as the annual growth rate in 
percent form. Bank Liquidity Ratio is the ratio between a bank’s liquid assets and reserves. Domestic 
Credit refers to credit provided by financial institutions scaled by GDP. Domestic Credit (banks) refers to 
credit provided by all banks scaled by GDP. FPI is foreign portfolio investment is investment (in dollars) in 
the equity of foreign companies. Initial FPI is the value of FPI in period t-3. FPI Vol is the variance of FPI 
net flows from time t-3 through t-1. FPI/PCF is FPI scaled by gross private capital flows. XFX Rate is the 
official exchange rate with the dollar. Fiscal Burden is a measure of the level of taxes usurped by the 
government from corporations from 1(fewer taxes) to 5 (higher taxes). GDP growth is the growth rate of 
gross domestic product. Institutional Inv. Rating is an index of a country’s credit worthiness. Inflation is 
defined as the increase in consumer price index (%). M2 refers to the money supply scaled by GDP. Market 
Cap Percent is the market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP). FDI/GDP is the amount of 
foreign direct investment. Property Rights is a measure from 1 (most effective) to 5 (least effective) 
measuring the efficacy of a country’s legal system. Real interest rates refer to the prevailing interest rates 
adjusted for inflation. Share is the percent of the world market capitalization represented by a country’s 
market capitalization. Corruption is an assigned value for a given country regarding its level of corruption 
(0 highest; 6 lowest). Invest is an index of the risk involved in investing in a country. Law is an index 
which refers to the level of legal development. Income is an index referring to a nation’s level of income.  
Liberalization is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if a country has undergone a liberalization in the 
current period and zero otherwise. 
Panel A:  Small Firm Characteristics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Asset Tangibility 41503 0.41 0.57 0.00 73.42 
Cash 31814 18.68 21.25 0 100 
Crosslisting 41723 0.14 0.35 0 1 
EFN 33015 0.23 4.57 -369.56 397.26 
Growth in Sales 26667 0.23 1.04 -10.91 15.77 
Growth in Total Assets 27019 0.27 0.97 -10.38 14.37 
Leverage 33727 1.48 137.43 0 25155 
Profitability 35125 -7.11 127.61 -7150.50 1548.37 
Risk 41501 0.59 9.90 -180.18 911.88 
Total Assets/GDP 35765 0.04 5.19 0 972.71 
Panel B:  Large Firm Characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Asset Tangibility 36927 37.48 59.95 0 72.98 
Cash 34089 15.24 19.48 0 155 
Crosslisting 41913 0.07 0.26 0 1 
EFN 32301 0.22 29.41 -18.87 5221.79 
Growth in Sales 23525 0.04 0.88 -12.88 12.43 
Growth in Total Assets 23767 0.04 0.80 -13.56 9.33 
Leverage 32780 1.10 41.32 0 6799 
Profitability 34197 -3.46 131.12 -11102.00 744.48 
Risk 40408 3.14 458.98 -3.73 91268.34 
Total Assets/GDP 34848 0.4 16.23 0 2540.48 
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Panel C:  Country-level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bank Liquidity Ratio 311 6.663 7.323 0.024 60.800 
Corruption 352 3.831 1.325 1 6 
DomCredit (bank)/GDP 352 93.580 53.295 12.279 320.557 
DomCredit/GDP 352 78.712 47.630 11.357 202.510 
FDI/GDP 352 0.089 0.561 -0.027 6.185 
FPI 345 -0.006 0.106 -0.419 0.488 
FPI Volatility 352 4.87E+20 1.80E+21 0 1.62E+22 
X FX Rate 352 0.071 0.292 -1 2.490 
GDP Growth 352 0.034 0.023 -0.069 0.106 
Institutional Inv. Rating 352 60.06 23.01 14.45 95.90 
Invest 352 8.281 2.033 2.417 12 
Law 352 4.727 1.347 1 6 
Property Rightss 352 1.887 0.932 1 4 
Relative Int. Rates 352 1.005 1.279 -5.990 8.772 
Share 352 8.908 16.789 0.002 100 
Total Value Traded 352 0.450 0.639 0.000 4.834 
Panel D:  Crisis Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CrisisStar (across time) 347 0.185 0.165 0.001 0.999 
Propensity for Crisis (1995) 347 0.202 0.261 0 1 
Propensity for Crisis (1996) 347 0.218 0.225 0 1 
Propensity for Crisis (1997) 347 0.276 0.260 0 1 
Propensity for Crisis (1998) 347 0.128 0.197 0 1 
Propensity for Crisis (1999) 347 0.146 0.259 2.61E-06 1 
Propensity for Crisis (2000) 347 0.211 0.227 5.45E-09 1 
Propensity for Crisis (2001) 347 0.224 0.270 0 1 
Propensity for Crisis (2002) 347 0.050 0.086 0 0.996 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1991-1994) 347 0.250 0.129 0.060 0.664 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1992-1995) 347 0.245 0.128 0.040 0.672 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1993-1996) 347 0.250 0.129 0.024 0.639 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1994-1997) 347 0.254 0.126 0.005 0.626 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1995-1998) 347 0.236 0.120 0.003 0.592 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1996-1999) 347 0.225 0.126 0.000 0.583 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1997-2000) 347 0.238 0.130 0.001 0.579 
Avg Propensity for Crisis (1998-2001) 336 0.233 0.130 0.000 0.582 
Chg in Propensity (1995) 339 -0.092 0.063 -0.237 0.316 
Chg in Propensity (1996) 336 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 
Chg in Propensity (1997) 336 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.008 
Chg in Propensity (1998) 336 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.008 
Chg in Propensity (1999) 336 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.008 
Chg in Propensity (2000) 336 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Chg in Propensity (2001) 336 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.008 
Chg in Propensity (2002) 336 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
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Panel E:  Security Issuance by Country For Sample 
Country Debt Conv. Debt Equity Preferred 
Conv. 
Preferred Total 
Argentina 29 10 61 2 . 102 
Australia 21 58 8245 48 . 8372 
Austria 2 . 91 . . 93 
Belgium . . 173 . . 173 
Bolivia 6 . . 1 . 7 
Brazil 94 25 51 35 . 205 
Canada . . 26 14 . 40 
Chile 37 . 160 . . 197 
China 7 . 1291 . . 1298 
Colombia 23 . 32 . . 55 
Denmark . 1 192 . . 193 
Finland 6 1 224 . . 231 
France 48 11 1207 . . 1266 
Germany 6 1 585 7 . 599 
Greece . 2 133 . . 135 
Hong Kong 4 5 900 . . 909 
Hungary . . 16 . . 16 
India 125 . 179 . . 304 
Indonesia 40 . 128 . . 168 
Ireland . . 41 . . 41 
Israel . . 8 . . 8 
Italy 3 . 203 1 . 207 
Japan 2149 239 1951 . . 4339 
Malaysia 64 2 418 1 . 485 
Mexico 91 1 33 . . 125 
Netherlands 10 1 136 6 . 153 
New Zealand 2 5 42 3 . 52 
Norway 1 1 102 . . 104 
Pakistan . . 22 . . 22 
Peru 143 . 3 . . 146 
Philippines 18 . 42 . . 60 
Poland . 2 32 . . 34 
Portugal . . 46 1 . 47 
Singapore 59 . 314 . . 373 
South Korea . . 397 9 . 406 
Spain 5 . 98 . . 103 
Sri Lanka . . 11 . . 11 
Sweden 22 . 236 . . 258 
Switzerland 51 7 104 1 . 163 
Thailand 71 2 77 . . 150 
Turkey . . 11 . . 11 
United Kingdom 7 . 1855 12 . 1874 
US 42 121 3438 3620 17 7238 
Venezuela 19 . 38 1 . 58 
Total 3205 495 23352 3762 17 31831 
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Panel F: Investment Around the World 
FPI is net foreign portfolio investment scaled by GDP. FPI Vol is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net 
flows scaled by GDP, from time t-3 through t-1. MarketCapDollars is the market capitalization of country j 
in U.S. dollars. Property Rights is an index of the level of property rights in country j.  FXRate is country 
j’s local currency per $1. Values are averaged over the sample period 1996-2003. 
 
FPI 
FPI 
Volatility 
MarketCap 
Dollars 
Property 
Rights FXRate 
Argentina 1.538 0.449 9.61E+10 2.5 1.263 
Australia 2.708 0.446 3.41E+11 1 1.238 
Austria 1.076 0.456 3.24E+10 1 12.304 
Belgium -5.116 0.465 1.67E+11 1 36.052 
Bolivia -0.297 0.324 2.45E+08 3.125 5.849 
Brazil 2.059 0.460 2.11E+11 3 1.635 
Canada 0.250 0.453 6.61E+11 1 1.462 
Chile -0.250 0.414 6.41E+10 1 509.906 
China -0.191 0.439 3.33E+11 4 8.293 
Colombia 0.713 0.402 1.35E+10 3.25 1658.071 
Denmark -1.039 0.454 9.36E+10 1 6.998 
Finland -0.135 0.425 1.96E+11 1 5.311 
France -0.947 0.481 1.07E+12 2 5.899 
Germany 0.018 0.490 1.08E+12 1 1.770 
Great Britain 1.420 0.497 2.27E+12 1 0.641 
Greece 2.725 0.430 8.65E+10 2.25 261.711 
Hong Kong -0.120 0.464 4.99E+11 1 7.763 
Hungary 3.258 0.422 1.11E+10 2 217.940 
India 0.591 0.416 1.39E+11 3 41.160 
Indonesia 0.236 0.415 4.42E+10 3.375 6679.344 
Ireland -8.426 0.442 4.56E+10 1 0.707 
Israel 1.777 0.417 5.17E+10 2 3.827 
Italy 1.221 0.477 5.52E+11 2 1761.769 
Japan -0.876 0.471 3.19E+12 1.25 115.400 
Malaysia -0.993 0.402 1.52E+11 2.375 3.370 
Mexico 1.375 0.460 1.22E+11 3 8.636 
Netherlands -2.477 0.456 5.53E+11 1 1.968 
New Zealand -0.085 0.413 2.63E+10 1 1.417 
Norway -5.081 0.443 6.04E+10 1 7.623 
Pakistan 0.854 0.377 7.88E+09 3.375 47.615 
Peru 1.048 0.395 1.23E+10 3.125 3.049 
Phillipines 2.085 0.424 5.11E+10 2.375 38.559 
Poland 0.678 0.413 2.11E+10 2 3.545 
Portugal 0.413 0.428 4.92E+10 2 179.444 
Singapore -12.366 0.437 1.44E+11 1 1.624 
South Korea 0.0001 0.443 6.54E+10 1 1103.469 
Spain 0.082 0.472 3.85E+11 2 148.772 
Sri Lanka 0.058 0.334 1.56E+09 2.875 70.373 
Sweden -4.389 0.449 2.92E+11 1.625 8.364 
Switzerland -7.079 0.457 6.46E+11 1.125 1.470 
Thailand 1.108 0.416 5.58E+10 1.75 36.057 
Turkey -0.002 0.430 5.84E+10 2.25 617279.900
USA 1.997 0.501 1.28E+13 1 1.000 
Venezuela -0.055 0.408 2.65E+10 3 239.550 
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Panel G:  Country Development and Size Distribution 
Property Rights groups are assigned on a yearly basis and are based on market capitalization.  Size groups 
are assigned on both a yearly and within country basis and are based on total assets. 
 
Property Rights Freq. Percent Cum.  Size Freq. Percent Cum. 
Developed 181,395 94.21 94.21  Small 43,072 33.26 33.26 
Less Developed 11,146 5.79 100  Large 43,257 33.4 100 
Developed Property Rights  Less Developed Property Rights 
Size Freq. Percent Cum.  Size Freq. Percent Cum. 
Small 39,343 33.29 33.29  Small 2,870 32.71 32.71 
Medium 39,417 33.33 66.63  Medium 2,909 33.72 66.43 
Large 39,491 33.37 100  Large 2,908 33.57 100 
Panel H:  Geographic Distribution of Sample 
Nation Freq. Percent Cum.  Nation Freq. Percent Cum. 
Argentina 381 0.20 0.20 Italy 1,031 0.55 35.05
Australia 14,907 7.97 8.17 Japan 29,724 15.9 50.95
Austria 418 0.22 8.39 Malaysia 3,217 1.72 52.69
Belgium 571 0.31 8.71 Mexico 691 0.37 53.06
Bolivia 22 0.01 8.74 Netherlands 785 0.42 53.48
Canada 91 0.05 8.79 New Zealand 856 0.46 53.94
Chili 1,542 0.82 9.61 Norway 1,353 0.72 54.66
China 6,345 3.39 13.00 Pakistan 979 0.52 55.18
Colombia 165 0.09 13.09 Peru 502 0.27 55.47
Denmark 554 0.30 13.40 Philippines 2,474 1.32 56.79
Ecuador 11 0.01 13.41 Poland 1,329 0.71 57.50
Finland 1,354 0.72 14.13 Portugal 630 0.34 57.84
France 7,634 4.08 18.21 Singapore 3,581 1.92 59.76
Germany 3,997 2.14 20.35 South Korea 2,286 1.22 60.99
Great Britain 15,527 8.30 28.65 Spain 519 0.28 61.27
Greece 1,338 0.72 29.37 Sri Lanka 69 0.04 61.31
Hong Kong 3,618 1.94 31.31 Sweden 2,748 1.47 62.78
Hungary 458 0.24 31.55 Switzerland 756 0.40 63.18
India 1,560 0.83 32.39 Thailand 3,748 2.00 66.84
Indonesia 2,946 1.58 33.97 Turkey 2,718 1.45 68.29
Ireland 727 0.39 34.36 United States 57,992 31.02 99.31
Israel 260 0.14 34.50 Venezuela 58 0.03 99.34
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Panel I: Firm-Level Variable Correlation
Cash Leverage
Asset
Tangibility Profitability Risk Crosslisting
Growth in
Total Assets
Leverage -0.366*** 1
Asset Tangibility -0.239*** 0.114*** 1
Profitability -0.027*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 1
Risk 0.251*** -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.042*** 1
EFN 0.015*** 0.031*** -0.003 -0.001 0.030*** 1
Crosslisting -0.005* 0.012*** 0.040*** 0.005* 0.021*** -0.001
Growth in Total Assets 0.084*** 0.038*** 0.000 -0.011*** -0.047*** 0.017*** 1.000
Growth in Sales 0.116*** -0.006 -0.008** -0.118*** 0.005 0.019*** 0.712***
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Panel J: Chapter 1 Country-level Variable Correlation
Property
Rights FPI
X FX
Rate Share
FPI
Volatility
GDP
Growth FDI/GDP
Bank
Liquidity
Ratio
Dom.
Credit
/GDP
Dom.
Credit
(bank)
/GDP Invest Law
FPI 0.243*** 1.000
X FX Rate 0.065 0.059 1.000
Share -0.303*** 0.025 0.026 1.000
FPI Volatility -0.226*** 0.123** -0.066 0.425*** 1.000
GDP Growth 0.099* -0.192*** 0.041 -0.075 -0.121** 1.000
FDI/GDP -0.111** -0.462*** -0.017 -0.041 -0.089* 0.023 1.000
Bank Liquidity Ratio 0.519*** 0.140** 0.041 -0.255*** -0.196*** 0.169*** -0.066 1.000
Dom. Credit/GDP -0.511*** -0.246*** -0.130** 0.364*** 0.274*** 0.036 0.088* -0.435*** 1.000
Dom. Credit
(bank)/GDP -0.440*** -0.177*** -0.126** 0.452*** 0.254*** -0.077 0.029 -0.392*** 0.914*** 1.000
Invest -0.363*** -0.239*** -0.081 0.055 0.180*** 0.003 0.136** -0.191*** 0.279*** 0.196*** 1.000
Law -0.763*** -0.232*** -0.032 0.260*** 0.210*** 0.059 0.101* -0.423*** 0.502*** 0.434*** 0.241*** 1.000
Corruption -0.632*** -0.134** -0.012 0.136** 0.116** -0.075 0.113** -0.302*** 0.290*** 0.224*** 0.236*** 0.676***
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Panel K: Chapter 2 Country-level Variable Correlation
FPI Vol Rel Vol Del Vol FPI
GDP
Growth FDI
X FX
Rate TVT
Rel Int.
Rates
Corrup-
tion Savings
Dom
Credit
Invest-
ment
Grade
Rel Vol 0.057 1.000
X Vol 0.102* 0.208*** 1.000
FPI -0.013 -0.063 -0.024 1.000
GDP Growth 0.018 -0.197*** 0.009 -0.190*** 1.000
FDI 0.040 0.060 0.060 -0.453*** 0.051 1.000
X FX Rate 0.024 -0.057 0.011 0.051 0.064 -0.030 1.000
TVT 0.126** 0.281*** 0.066 -0.241*** 0.060 -0.032 -0.093* 1.000
Rel Int. Rates -0.042 -0.081 -0.056 0.190*** -0.128** -0.049 0.106** -0.205*** 1.000
Corruption 0.097* 0.304*** -0.007 -0.141*** -0.079 0.079 -0.025 0.145*** -0.207*** 1.000
Savings -0.009 0.060 -0.029 -0.422*** 0.400*** 0.184*** -0.019 0.145*** -0.281*** 0.065 1.000
Dom Credit -0.017 0.427*** 0.004 -0.255*** 0.056 0.091* -0.137** 0.530*** -0.280 0.301 0.432 1.000
Investment
Grade -0.037 0.257*** -0.011 -0.154*** -0.232*** 0.152 -0.024 0.350*** -0.116** 0.112** 0.005 0.229*** 1.000
NonInvest-
ment
Grade 0.037 -0.257*** 0.011 0.154*** 0.232*** -0.152*** 0.024 -0.350*** 0.116** -0.112** -0.005 -0.229*** -1.000
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
X IIR
Investment
Grade
NonInvestment
Grade Reserves
Net Capital
Acct
Investment
Grade 0.043 1.000
NonInvestment
Grade -0.043 -1.000 1.000
Reserves -0.109** 0.206*** -0.206*** 1.000
Net Capital Acct 0.137** -0.066 0.066 -0.425*** 1.000
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table II Access to Capital
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = F0 + FPIj,t-1 F1 + Xi,t-1 F2 + Yj,t-1 F3 + Ii + t + E. Development groups are based on the level of
property rights in a nation. Size groups are formed based on terciles. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents
the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1 + Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 +
FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap scaled by world market capitalization.
RelIntRates is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance
of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP.
Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is the difference between GDP and
consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived investment environment of credit extended by banks. Law is an index referring to the development of
the legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. All country-level variables are three year trailing moving averages. Observations are
firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the
appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Developed Property Rights (N=25202) Less Developed Property Rights (N=1775)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPI 0.937*** 0.874*** 0.847*** 1.028*** 2.595*** 2.960** 3.396*** 2.083
[0.209] [0.058] [0.144] [0.104] [0.286] [1.299] [0.150] [2.806]
GDP Growth -3.049*** -2.384*** -3.365*** -3.351*** 1.046 1.153 1.233 1.738
[0.311] [0.534] [0.010] [0.290] [0.985] [0.867] [1.852] [1.118]
Foreign Direct Inv. -1.557*** -1.194*** -1.799*** -1.811*** 1.809 1.546 1.259 1.675
[0.226] [0.219] [0.151] [0.213] [1.132] [2.976] [1.745] [1.170]
Domestic Credit -0.254*** -0.242*** -0.293*** -0.266*** -0.037 -0.061 -0.072 -0.003
[0.023] [0.011] [0.003] [0.012] [0.175] [0.285] [0.196] [0.019]
Savings 1.626*** 1.385*** 1.818*** 1.794*** 1.311** 1.450** 1.610* 1.122
[0.193] [0.020] [0.134] [0.091] [0.622] [0.574] [0.968] [0.818]
Investment -0.016*** 0.007
[0.005] [0.025]
Law and Order 0.062*** 0.000
[0.006] [0.045]
Corruption 0.023*** 0.086***
[0.002] [0.018]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.361 0.363 0.381 0.363 0.857 0.861 0.871 0.867
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 1119*** 1175*** 1123*** 1153*** 374*** 374*** 374*** 376***
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Table III Access to Equity Capital
The following probit model is specified: P(Equity Issuance | Capital Issuance=1)i,t = H 0 + FPIj,t-1 H1 + Xi,t-1 H 2 + Yj,t-1 H 3 + Ii + t + E. Development groups are
based on the level of property rights in a nation. Size groups are formed based on terciles. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic
product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1 + Sharej,t-1?2 +
RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap scaled by world
market capitalization. RelIntRates is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is liberalized in time t.
FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct
investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is the difference
between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived investment environment of credit extended by banks. Law is an index referring to
the development of the legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. All country-level variables are three year trailing moving
averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable
definitions are listed in the appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Developed Property Rights (N=17177) Less Developed Property Rights (N=1703)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPI 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.042 0.049 0.039 0.032
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.033] [0.039] [0.031] [0.026]
GDP Growth -2.041*** -1.651*** -2.012*** -1.252*** 1.948 2.904 1.840 3.290
[0.310] [0.295] [0.307] [0.336] [1.565] [2.339] [1.507] [2.612]
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.566* 1.558*** 0.550* 0.353 -2.215 -2.661 -1.986 -1.815
[0.250] [0.311] [0.252] [0.299] [1.932] [2.365] [1.826] [1.825]
Domestic Credit -0.057*** -0.023 -0.055** -0.064*** 0.037 0.084 0.037 0.125
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.039] [0.073] [0.039] [0.112]
Savings 0.250*** -0.064 0.238** 0.162* 0.490 0.330 0.394 0.086
[0.071] [0.086] [0.081] [0.072] [0.398] [0.303] [0.352] [0.252]
Investment -0.018*** -0.019
[0.003] [0.016]
Law and Order -0.003 0.008
[0.006] [0.010]
Corruption -0.023*** 0.067
[0.005] [0.053]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.326 0.327 0.341 0.328 0.705 0.711 0.802 0.742
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 1119*** 1175*** 1123*** 1153*** 374*** 374*** 374*** 376***
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Table IV Access to Bank Credit
Panel A utilizes the following robust OLS model: Debtj,t/Liquidityj,t= I0 + FPIj,t-1I1 + Yj,t-1 I2 + t + E. Specification (1) uses Domestic Credit from banks only as
the dependent variable, specification (2) uses Domestic Credit provided by banks and other financial institutions and specification (3) uses the liquidity of bank
assets as a dependent variable. Panel B utilizes the following robust OLS: (Short-term/Long-term/Total) Lev i,t = L0 + FPIj,t-1L1 + Yj,t-1L 2 + Xi,t-1L 3 + Ii + t + E.
Specification (1) uses Short-term Leverage as the dependent variable, specification (2), Long-term leverage and specification (3) total leverage. Development
groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Dependent variables are listed across the top of both panels. FPI is foreign portfolio investment
standardized by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-
1?1 + Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap
scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is
liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of
foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is
the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. All country-level variables are three year trailing moving averages. Observations are firm-year
specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix. *, **,
*** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Panel A: Country Level
Developed Property Rights Less Developed Property Rights
1 2 3 1 2 3
FPI -10.067 -5.816 0.452 0.258 -0.666 -0.777
[6.416] [4.276] [0.304] [1.706] [1.827] [0.711]
Foreign Direct Inv. -22.289 -12.864 0.29 4.037** 6.157*** 0.550
[13.242] [7.696] [0.494] [1.644] [1.326] [0.835]
Relative Int. Rates -47.975* -35.162** 3.054* -0.654 0.487 0.700
[27.157] [16.318] [1.763] [2.426] [2.580] [1.053]
Fiscal Burden -55.234 -37.393 2.132 10.21 5.967 -2.395
[36.135] [23.447] [1.457] [9.378] [9.060] [4.288]
Savings -5.838 -2.718 0.316 2.661*** 2.422*** 0.104
[4.983] [3.218] [0.205] [0.368] [0.348] [0.130]
GDP Growth -3.477 -1.768 0.213 0.08 0.941* -0.323
[4.034] [2.432] [0.178] [0.382] [0.503] [0.372]
N 153 153 132 72 72 71
Model R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.74 0.78 0.09
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Panel B: Firm Level
Developed Property Rights Less Developed Property Rights
1 2 3 1 2 3
FPITotal -0.063*** 0.027*** -3.245*** 0.022 0.022 1.525
[0.005] [0.010] [0.393] [0.016] [0.040] [1.117]
GDP Growth -0.081*** 0.092*** -2.228*** -0.021 0.032 -2.123*
[0.008] [0.013] [0.560] [0.018] [0.037] [1.228]
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.043*** -0.059*** 1.580*** -0.007 0.116** 0.821
[0.008] [0.011] [0.574] [0.026] [0.049] [2.009]
Domestic Credit 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.351*** 0.004*** -0.002 0.179*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.034] [0.001] [0.004] [0.103]
Savings -0.026*** -0.002 -2.181*** 0.012* -0.022 0.499
[0.004] [0.007] [0.286] [0.007] [0.021] [0.582]
N 24528 19913 25202 1768 1374 1775
R-squared (1st stage) 0.345 0.344 0.346 0.577 0.585 0.577
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13
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Table V Growth
The following OLS model is specified: Growthi,t = N0 + FPIj,t-1N1 + Yj,t-1 N2 + Xi,t-1 N3 + Ii + t + E where Growth is defined as the log difference in total assets
(Panel A) and sales revenue (Panel B) divided by the number of years between observations. Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a
nation. Dependent variables are listed across the top of both panels. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the
instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1 + Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj-
,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates is
country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows
in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic
Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled
by GDP. All country-level variables are three year trailing moving averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for
brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1
percent respectively.
Panel A: Growth in terms of Total Assets
Developed Property Rights (N=17353) Less Developed Property Rights (N=874)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPI 1.176* 1.280** 1.588*** 1.145* 2.516** 2.380** 2.632** 2.697***
[0.601] [0.602] [0.587] [0.661] [1.067] [1.085] [1.218] [1.034]
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.015 -0.846 -0.529 0.115 1.246 2.197 1.185 1.199
[0.625] [0.667] [0.732] [0.754] [1.330] [1.506] [1.345] [1.325]
GDP Growth 3.279*** 1.425* 3.120*** 3.381*** 2.568** 2.534** 2.625** 2.823**
[0.682] [0.844] [0.662] [0.692] [1.089] [1.099] [1.141] [1.149]
Domestic Credit -0.04 -0.069 -0.110* -0.036 -0.148 -0.034 -0.147 -0.166
[0.043] [0.043] [0.059] [0.048] [0.172] [0.159] [0.168] [0.189]
Savings -0.234 0.352 0.377 -0.295 0.49 0.098 0.511 0.582
[0.465] [0.498] [0.592] [0.574] [0.810] [0.735] [0.829] [0.882]
Investment 0.039*** -0.052**
[0.009] [0.022]
Law and Order 0.075** -0.002
[0.037] [0.035]
Corruption -0.007 0.023
[0.018] [0.046]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.373 0.374 0.402 0.377 0.848 0.852 0.864 0.858
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10
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Panel B: Growth in terms of Sales Revenue
Developed Property Rights (N=17337) Less Developed Property Rights (N=885)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPI 1.327** 1.422** 1.828*** 1.427** 0.879 1.482 0.691 1.345
[0.604] [0.610] [0.600] [0.686] [1.954] [1.836] [1.896] [1.896]
Foreign Direct Inv. -1.124* -1.843** -1.814** -1.246 -0.736 -1.297 -0.651 -0.975
[0.644] [0.728] [0.772] [0.804] [2.129] [2.789] [2.118] [2.185]
GDP Growth 4.993*** 3.475*** 4.792*** 4.922*** 3.181* 3.266** 3.399* 2.865*
[0.690] [0.864] [0.673] [0.695] [1.641] [1.647] [1.734] [1.511]
Domestic Credit -0.009 -0.035 -0.094 -0.017 -0.149 -0.195 -0.124 -0.139
[0.048] [0.049] [0.066] [0.054] [0.208] [0.191] [0.205] [0.194]
Savings -0.036 0.459 0.709 0.068 0.279 0.57 0.22 0.319
[0.484] [0.531] [0.626] [0.619] [1.157] [1.007] [1.160] [1.087]
Investment 0.032*** 0.011
[0.009] [0.035]
Law and Order 0.093** -0.017
[0.038] [0.041]
Corruption 0.007 -0.038
[0.019] [0.046]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.372 0.373 0.401 0.376 0.848 0.852 0.862 0.857
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
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Table VI Robustness Check on Measurements
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = F0 + FPIj,t-1 F1 + Xi,t-1 F2 + Yj,t-1 F3 + Ii + t + E. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized
by gross domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1 +
Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap
scaled by world market capitalization. RelIntRates is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is
liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of
foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. Savings is
the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived investment environment of credit extended by banks. Law is an index
referring to the development of the legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. All country-level variables are three year trailing
moving averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed
variable definitions are listed in the appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Panel A: Alternative Measure of Constraint
Developed Property Rights (N=28722) Less Developed Property Rights (N=4165)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPI Total * Small 4.203*** 6.380*** 5.684*** 12.365*** -6.798 -7.653 -7.019*** -5.545
[0.859] [0.908] [0.200] [1.537] [6.711] [6.432] [1.693] [5.875]
FPI Total * Large -0.85 -1.718*** -0.133 -4.824*** 8.491* 9.530* 8.620*** 7.748*
[0.563] [0.432] [0.174] [0.815] [4.877] [5.249] [0.145] [4.099]
GDP Growth 1.930*** 2.092*** 2.673*** 1.881*** -1.994*** -1.975*** -2.057** -1.673
[0.180] [0.130] [0.257] [0.186] [0.766] [0.611] [0.845] [1.061]
Foreign Direct Inv. -2.130*** -2.859*** -3.475*** -4.211*** 0.818 0.246 0.804 0.898
[0.105] [0.255] [0.042] [0.380] [2.211] [2.104] [0.765] [1.126]
Savings 1.091*** 1.374*** 2.600*** 1.805*** 2.753*** 2.965*** 2.748*** 2.787***
[0.019] [0.093] [0.146] [0.120] [0.171] [1.062] [0.051] [0.576]
Investment 0.012*** 0.024
[0.001] [0.029]
Law and Order 0.143*** 0.004
[0.002] [0.033]
Corruption 0.057*** 0.026
[0.004] [0.023]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.301 0.334 0.314 0.308 0.833 0.883 0.836 0.836
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 4380*** 4409*** 4630*** 4600*** 902*** 906*** 903*** 924***
Small-Large 0.027** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.179 0.295
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Panel B: Implied Increases in Foreign Portfolio Investment
Developed Property Rights (N=18737) Less Developed Property Rights (N=381)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FPITotal 0.856*** 0.848*** 0.502*** 0.749*** 4.015* 4.162 3.879*** 2.922**
[0.189] [0.130] [0.136] [0.150] [2.226] [4.238] [1.145] [1.172]
GDP Growth -3.438*** -3.050*** -4.160*** -3.332*** 4.018 2.735* 4.457 3.448**
[0.172] [0.503] [0.271] [0.444] [2.519] [1.577] [2.844] [1.498]
Foreign Direct Inv. -1.685*** -1.315*** -1.563*** -1.548*** -4.358 0.104 -6.33 -3.333
[0.323] [0.209] [0.323] [0.136] [4.615] [2.001] [6.225] [2.353]
Domestic Credit -0.289*** -0.282*** -0.307*** -0.284*** 0.815 -0.029 0.976* 0.479
[0.018] [0.021] [0.023] [0.010] [0.801] [0.721] [0.558] [0.426]
Savings 1.584*** 1.377*** 1.531*** 1.473*** -0.291 1.717 0.13 0.592
[0.193] [0.056] [0.182] [0.119] [2.518] [1.494] [1.559] [1.181]
Investment -0.013*** 0.151**
[0.002] [0.074]
Law and Order 0.065*** -0.102
[0.009] [0.245]
Corruption -0.008 -0.097
[0.005] [0.087]
R-squared (1st stage) 0.651 0.698 0.658 0.664 0.974 0.986 0.976 0.985
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 2201*** 2205*** 2226*** 2299*** 92*** 95*** 98*** 99***
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Table VII  Robustness:  Interaction with Investment Environment 
The following probit model is specified, adjusting for frequency of country observation: P(Capital 
Issuance)i,t = F0 + FPIj,t-1 F1 + Xi,t-1 F2 + Yj,t-1 F3 + FPI*(Invest/Law/Corr)F4+(Invest/Law/Corr)F5 + Ii + t +
E. Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Size groups are formed based 
on terciles. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross domestic product and represents the 
instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression:  FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1
+ Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real 
foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap scaled by world market capitalization.  RelIntRates 
is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country j is 
liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 through t-3. GDP Growth is the 
average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. 
Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic banks and financial institutions. 
Savings is the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. Investment is the perceived 
investment environment of credit extended by banks. Law is an index referring to the development of the 
legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. All country-level variables are 
three year trailing moving averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are 
left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the 
appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 1 2 3 
GDP Growth -0.361 -2.089*** -3.099*** 
[0.315] [0.652] [0.326] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.19 -1.385*** 0.992*** 
 [0.155] [0.495] [0.334] 
Domestic Credit -0.110*** -0.250*** -0.144*** 
 [0.019] [0.011] [0.016] 
Savings 0.394*** 1.828*** 1.630*** 
 [0.117] [0.135] [0.086] 
FPI 1.008** 0.251 -6.562*** 
 [0.479] [1.693] [1.335] 
FPI*Investment -0.202***   
 [0.061]   
Investment -0.023***   
 [0.002]   
FPI*Law and Order  0.076  
 [0.333]  
Law and Order  0.061***  
 [0.012]  
FPI*Corruption   1.826*** 
 [0.324] 
Corruption   0.001 
 [0.002] 
Observations 26977 26977 26977 
R-squared (1st stage) 0.264 0.253 0.279 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model \2 999*** 894*** 994*** 
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Table VIII  Alternate Definitions 
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = F0 + FPIj,t-1 F1 + Xi,t-1 F2 + Yj,t-1 F3 + Ii + t
+ E. Development groups are based on the level of property rights in a nation. Specification (1) uses FPI as 
a proportion of gross private capital flows as an alternative FPI definition. Specification (2) uses the  
average size classification (i.e. size=small, medium or large) for the examiniation period. Specification (3) 
drops China, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea and Chile from the sample to avoid any bias due to changes 
capital controls during the period examined. FPI is foreign portfolio investment standardized by gross 
domestic product and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression:  
FPIj,t = FPIj,t = ?0 + AFXRatej,t-1?1 + Sharej,t-1?2 + RelIntRatesj,t-1?3 +Libj,t-1 ?4 + FPIVolj,t-1 ?5 + t + E.
XFXRate is the change in the real foreign exchange rate. Share is country j’s market cap scaled by world 
market capitalization.  RelIntRates is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates. Lib is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if country j is liberalized in time t. FPIVol is the variance of FPI flows in times t-1 
through t-3. GDP Growth is the average of GDP growth. Foreign Direct Inv. is the level of foreign direct 
investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the public by domestic 
banks and financial institutions. Savings is the difference between GDP and consumption, scaled by GDP. 
Investment is the perceived investment environment of credit extended by banks. Law is an index referring 
to the development of the legal system. Corruption is an index that reflects the level of corruption. All 
country-level variables are three year trailing moving averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-
level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable 
definitions are listed in the appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent 
respectively. 
 
Developed Property Rights Less Developed Property Rights 
1 2 3 1 2 3
FPI -0.072*** 0.334*** 1.515*** -0.061 5.133*** 4.156*** 
[0.002] [0.062] [0.511] [0.071] [1.629] [1.247] 
GDP Growth -3.069*** -0.349*** -2.926*** -0.274 1.792 2.532*** 
 [0.367] [0.067] [0.367] [0.856] [1.907] [0.069] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.675*** -0.458*** -0.981*** 3.777** -0.566 1.235 
 [0.031] [0.085] [0.354] [1.688] [2.381] [3.534] 
Domestic Credit -0.119*** -0.143*** -0.277*** -0.092 -0.039 -0.227 
 [0.013] [0.004] [0.014] [0.162] [0.245] [0.235] 
Savings 0.643*** 0.677*** 2.335*** 0.935 2.462** 1.921*** 
 [0.020] [0.057] [0.421] [0.582] [1.186] [0.653] 
Observations 25290 28546 24696 1787 2354 1714 
R-squared (1st stage) 0.361 0.394 0.531 0.857 0.834 0.853 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model \2 1022*** 804*** 1068*** 377*** 552*** 337*** 
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Table IX Volatility and Access to Capital
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = ?0 + FPIVolj,t-1?1 + FPIj,t-1 ?2 + Xi,t-1?3 + Yj,t-1?4 + + Ii + t + E. Specification (1) is the whole
sample while specifications (2) and (3) are Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade country-years respectively. Investment grade (non-invesetment grade) is
those country-years greater than (less than) the annual median of the Institutional Investor Rating, which is a measure of a nation’s creditworthiness. FDI is the
level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned to the private sector. Savings is a nation’s GDP minus
consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross domestic product. FPI is net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI
is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage
regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = F0 + AFXRatej,t-2F1 + Corrj,t-2F2 + RelIRj,t-2F3 + ATVTj,t-2F4 + AIIRj,t-2F5 + t + E. AFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an
index denoted the level of corruption. RelIR is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates (by year). TVT is total value of listed shares traded. XIIR is
the change in the institutional investor rating, which proxies for changes in investor confidence or proximity to crisis. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-
level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Volatility Relative Volatility Change in Volatility
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
FPI Volatility -0.007** -0.026 -0.004** -0.108** -0.029 -0.058 -0.209*** -0.021*** -0.151***
[0.003] [0.037] [0.002] [0.048] [0.032] [0.042] [0.023] [0.004] [0.038]
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.912*** 0.524 0.992** 0.884*** 0.264 1.024*** 1.867*** 0.837* 1.426***
[0.300] [0.799] [0.503] [0.072] [0.496] [0.221] [0.260] [0.452] [0.272]
Domestic Credit -0.158*** -0.259*** -0.142*** -0.076*** -0.146*** -0.103*** -0.061*** -0.175*** -0.044
[0.011] [0.090] [0.020] [0.013] [0.016] [0.039] [0.019] [0.050] [0.028]
Savings 0.346*** 0.874 0.271*** 0.255** 0.159 0.245* -0.189*** 0.294 -0.125
[0.098] [0.638] [0.092] [0.106] [0.310] [0.137] [0.034] [0.418] [0.110]
GDP Growth 1.147 -7.718*** 1.235*** 0.222 -6.014*** 0.745*** 1.880*** -5.109*** 1.824***
[0.774] [0.891] [0.286] [0.181] [0.856] [0.233] [0.282] [0.734] [0.575]
FPI 0.502*** 0.352* 0.498*** 0.447*** 0.289*** 0.442*** 0.342*** 0.182 0.404***
[0.142] [0.200] [0.063] [0.023] [0.062] [0.084] [0.018] [0.141] [0.055]
Observations 52883 27738 25145 54072 28415 25657 54070 28415 25655
R-squared (1st stage) 0.106 0.711 0.146 0.376 0.819 0.146 0.068 0.522 0.096
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 334*** 501*** 9805*** 15003*** 2672*** 9805 14964*** 2679*** 10044***
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Table X Volatility and Firm Growth 
The following OLS model is specified: Growthit = U0 + FPIVolj,t-1U1 + FPIVolj,t-1U2 + FPIj,t-1U3 + Xi,t-1U7 +
Yj,t-1U6 + Ii + t + E. Size groups are formed based on terciles. Specification (1) is the whole sample while 
specifications (2) and (3) are Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade country-years respectively. 
Investment grade (noninvesetment grade) is those country-years greater than (less than) the annual median 
of the Institutional Investor Rating, which is a measure of a nation’s creditworthiness. Growth is defined as 
the logarithm of the difference in total assets scaled by the difference in years. FDI is the level of foreign 
direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned to the private sector.  
Savings is a nation’s GDP minus consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross domestic 
product. FPI is net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI is the logarithm of 
the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 and represents the instrumented value obtained from 
the following first stage regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = F0 + AFXRatej,t-2F1 + Corrj,t-2F2 + RelIRj,t-2F3 + ATVTj,t-2F4 +
AIIRj,t-2F5 + t + E. AFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an index denoted the level of 
corruption.  RelIR is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates (by year). TVT is total value of 
listed shares traded.  XIIR is the change in the institutional investor rating, which proxies for changes in 
investor confidence or proximity to crisis. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables 
are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 
5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Growth in Total Assets Growth in Sales Revenue 
1 2 3 1 2 3
FPI Volatility -1.237 -1.012 -3.610*** 2.366* 2.329 -1.13 
[1.789] [1.562] [1.233] [1.435] [1.656] [1.240] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.965 0.914 1.792* -0.168 -0.266 0.595 
 [0.915] [0.947] [1.043] [0.434] [0.472] [1.044] 
Domestic Credit -0.001 -0.008 0.076 -0.052 -0.036 0.089 
 [0.060] [0.070] [0.067] [0.041] [0.049] [0.075] 
Savings 0.368 0.372 -1.654*** 0.276 0.252 -1.031* 
 [0.656] [0.692] [0.600] [0.223] [0.238] [0.571] 
GDP Growth -0.573 -0.512 0.039 1.205** 1.121* 2.214 
 [0.886] [0.691] [1.947] [0.605] [0.667] [2.005] 
FPI 0.282 0.231 0.492** -0.209* -0.236* 0.144 
 [0.294] [0.312] [0.221] [0.113] [0.135] [0.177] 
Constant 0.217 0.084 1.761*** -1.340** -1.383* 0.548 
 [0.777] [0.673] [0.670] [0.668] [0.745] [0.686] 
Observations 35749 19515 16234 35493 19491 16002 
R-squared (1st stage) 0.106 0.711 0.146 0106 0.711 0.146 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.23 
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Table XI  Alternate Definitions and Sample   
The following probit model is specified, adjusting for frequency of country observation: P(Capital 
Issuance)i,t = W0 + FPIVolj,t-1W1 + FPIj,t-1 W2 + Xi,t-1W3 + Yj,t-1W4 + + Ii + t + ]. Development is based on level of 
property rights and size groups are formed based on terciles. Specification (1) uses FPI as a proportion of 
gross private capital flows as an alternative FPI (and FPI volatility) definition.  Specification (2) uses FPI 
as a proportion of market capitalization as an alternative FPI (and FPI volatility) definition. Specification 
(3) drops Malaysia and China from the sample to avoid any bias due to capital controls. FDI is the level of 
foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned to the private 
sector.  Savings is a nation’s GDP minus consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross 
domestic product. FPI is net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI is the 
logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 and represents the instrumented value 
obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = F0 + AFXRatej,t-2F1 + Corrj,t-2F2 + RelIRj,t-2F3
+ ATVTj,t-2F4 + AIIRj,t-2F5 + t + E. XFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an index denoted 
the level of corruption.  RelIR is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates (by year). TVT is 
total value of listed shares traded.  XIIR is the change in the institutional investor rating, which proxies for 
changes in investor confidence or proximity to crisis. All country-level variables are three year trailing 
moving averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  *, **, *** 
indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Investment Grade Noninvestment Grade 
1 2 3 1 2 3
FPI Volatility -0.000*** -0.048** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.006 -0.003*** 
[0.000] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.001] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.106 2.993*** 0.636 0.997*** -1.611 1.317*** 
 [0.116] [0.941] [0.637] [0.194] [1.823] [0.267] 
Domestic Credit -0.194*** -0.164*** -0.260*** -0.129*** -0.388*** -0.127*** 
 [0.018] [0.019] [0.030] [0.007] [0.062] [0.021] 
Savings 0.521*** 0.732*** 0.767*** 0.187* 2.287*** 0.607*** 
 [0.052] [0.202] [0.113] [0.103] [0.840] [0.022] 
GDP Growth -6.369*** -0.186 -7.610*** 0.313 -3.583*** 1.151*** 
 [0.631] [0.772] [0.265] [0.512] [0.611] [0.256] 
FPI 0.261*** 0.074 0.543*** 0.451*** 1.063*** 0.869*** 
 [0.051] [0.145] [0.029] [0.023] [0.146] [0.076] 
Observations 28415 25694 28415 25693 26006 24194 
R-squared (1st stage) 0.773 0.095 0.576 0.209 0.842 0.162 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model \2 2805*** 9914*** 2688*** 9957*** 2708*** 10791*** 
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Table XII  Access to Capital and the Propensity for Crisis  
In Sample Estimation 
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = N0 + FPIj,t-1 N1 + CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1N2
+FPIj,t-1N3 + Xi,t-1N4 + Yj,t-1N5 + Ii + t + E. Low (High) are based on whether the domicile country for the 
firm-year observation is lower (higher) than the median value for the sample that year. Propensity for Crisis 
is the fitted value of the following equation: Prob (y=1)j,t = V0 + V1FXRatej,t-1 + V2AIIR j,t-1 + V3Exports j,t-1 
+ V4NetCapAcct j,t-1 + V5Reserves j,t-1 + W where FXRate is the foreign exchange rate, XIIR is the change in 
the institutional investor rations, Exports is the level of exports, NetCapAcct is a country’s net capital 
account, and reserves is a country’s level of foreign exchange reserves. FPI is average net foreign portfolio 
investment flows scaled by GDP, from time t-3 through t-1. GDP Growth is the growth in gross domestic 
product. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the private sector scaled by GDP. Savings is 
gross domestic product minus investment, scaled by GDP. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption. 
Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 Capital Issuance Growth in Revenue 
All Low High All Low High 
Propensity for 
Crisis*FPI -6.100*** 1.851*** -8.057*** -0.108** 0.052 -0.066 
[1.572] [0.367] [0.729] [0.043] [0.042] [0.245] 
FPI 1.456*** 0.104*** 2.292*** 0.017* -0.015 0.000 
 [0.321] [0.015] [0.147] [0.009] [0.012] [0.004] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 1.254*** 0.070*** 3.082*** -0.001* 0.002** 0.045** 
 [0.378] [0.023] [0.368] [0.000] [0.001] [0.020] 
Propensity for Crisis -0.023*** 0.364*** -0.179*** 0.025** -0.017 -0.017* 
 [0.006] [0.021] [0.006] [0.010] [0.015] [0.009] 
GDP Growth -1.895*** -0.708*** -0.637*** -0.025* 0.003 0.043*** 
 [0.411] [0.052] [0.179] [0.015] [0.010] [0.009] 
Domestic Credit -0.153*** 0.005 -0.051*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 [0.021] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Savings 0.891*** 0.265*** 0.070** 0.001 0.005*** 0.021*** 
 [0.111] [0.051] [0.031] [0.003] [0.002] [0.008] 
Corruption 0.008** 0.003*** -0.004* -0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N 50817 21486 22019 38379 16602 16073 
F-Test (1st Stage-Crisis) 0.238 0.354 0.3 0.238 0.300 0.355 
F-Test (instr.-Crisis) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
F-Test (1st Stage-FPI) 0.291 0.464 0.268 0.291 0.268 0.464 
F-Test (instr.-FPI) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Model \2 10754*** 3859*** 6540*** 53*** 12*** 16*** 
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Table XIII  Access to Capital and the Propensity for Crisis  
Out of Sample Estimation 
The following cross-sectional probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)it = N0 + FPIj,t-1 N1 +
CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1N2 +FPIj,t-1N3 + Xi,t-1N4 + Yj,t-1N5 + Ii + t + E. Propensity for Crisis is the fitted value of 
the following equation for the trailing four-year period: Prob (y=1)j,t = V0 + V1FXRatej,t-1 + V2AIIR j,t-1 + 
V3Exports j,t-1 + V4NetCapAcct j,t-1 + V5Reserves j,t-1 + W where FXRate is the foreign exchange rate, XIIR is 
the change in the institutional investor rations, Exports is the level of exports, NetCapAcct is a country’s 
net capital account, and reserves is a country’s level of foreign exchange reserves. FPI is average net 
foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP, from time t-3 through t-1. GDP Growth is the growth in 
gross domestic product. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the private sector scaled by GDP. 
Savings is gross domestic product minus investment, scaled by GDP. Corr is an index denoted the level of 
corruption. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Propensity for Crisis*FPI -11.556*** -1.342** -0.334*** -0.008 1.327 -0.265*** -1.228***
[0.888] [0.605] [0.058] [0.009] [0.948] [0.079] [0.023] 
FPI 0.253*** 0.520*** 0.381*** -0.023** -0.006 0.073*** 1.148***
[0.014] [0.109] [0.070] [0.010] [0.020] [0.012] [0.280] 
Propensity for Crisis 0.004 0.000 -0.021*** -0.002*** -0.008 0.000 0.118* 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001] [0.011] [0.002] [0.064] 
GDP Growth -0.757*** -0.204*** -0.975*** 0.003*** -0.084 -0.088 0.622 
 [0.097] [0.040] [0.168] [0.000] [0.103] [0.079] [0.804] 
Foreign Direct Inv. 0.230*** 0.498*** 0.184*** -0.137** -0.451* 0.011 -0.983 
 [0.087] [0.064] [0.067] [0.062] [0.231] [0.042] [1.297] 
Domestic Credit -0.276*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.006** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.181***
[0.026] [0.003] [0.009] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.015] 
Savings 0.188*** 0.280*** 0.490*** 0.026** 0.350*** 0.185*** 2.094***
[0.034] [0.028] [0.083] [0.012] [0.044] [0.003] [0.544] 
Corruption -0.015*** -0.001 0.005** 0.001** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.106***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.009] 
N 5706 6294 7590 8138 8795 8268 4964 
F-Test (1st Stage) 0.765 0.857 0.810 0.419 0.630 0.484 0.761 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
F-Test (1st Stage) 0.743 0.765 0.694 0.697 0.775 0.699 0.582 
F-Test (instruments) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Model \2 1316*** 2112*** 2162*** 2903*** 2715*** 1040*** 540*** 
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Figure 1 Composition of Capital Inflows*
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Figure 2  Foreign Portfolio Investment Paths 
 
* Information obtained from Hull and Tesar, 2000. 
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Figure 3  Database Coverage of Financials 
 
Number of 
Companies 
% of Companies 
with Financials 
Coverage 
Datastream 18414 34% Listed Securities 
Worldscope 15810 67% Listed Securities 
REUTERS Over 21,000 Over 90% 
Listed Securities 
Pink Sheets 
OTC/BB 
Figure 4  Net Foreign Portfolio Investment Levels 
Values are calculated as net portfolio investment excluding liabilities involving government reserves. 
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Figure 5  Volatility of Net Foreign Portfolio Investment Levels 
Values are calculated as volatility of net foreign portfolio investment as measured by the variance of the previous three years scaled by 
net FPI flows for the same term. 
 
1.00E+17
1.00E+18
1.00E+19
1.00E+20
1.00E+21
1.00E+22
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
DPR
LDPR
86   
Figure 6 The Effect of FPI Volatility on Market Liquidity 
Graphs in the left column referred to countries with developed property rights and graphs in the right 
column refer to countries with less developed property rights.  The first row includes the entire examination 
period 1996-2003.  The second row examines only the country-years when a country’s Institutional 
Investor Rating is considered investment grade and the third row examines only the country-years when a 
country is considered noninvestment grade.  Liquidity is measured as market turnover.  FPI volatility is the 
logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from the period t-1 through t-3. 
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Appendix  Variable Definitions 
Panel A:  Firm- and Industry-specific  
Variable Definitions 
Asset tangibility Fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets; industry average is used in 
cases of missing data   
FA/TA 
Cash Cash or cash-equivalent divided by total assets  
Cash/TA 
 
Growth in assets Log difference of growth in total assets   
((ln(TAt+1) –ln(TAt))/(Yeart+1-Yeart)
Growth in sales Log difference of growth in sales   
((ln(Revt+1) – ln(Revt))/(Yeart+1-Yeart)
Leverage The logarithm of total Liabilities divided by total assets 
ln(Short-term, Long-term or Total) Liabilities/TA 
Profitability Operating income divided by sales  
OpInc/Sales (in Thous) 
Risk The log of the variance of the firm’s profitability ratio over the three years prior to 
issue; industry average is used in cases of missing data 
ln(var(ROAt, ROAt-1, ROAt-2)) 
Size Total Assets  
Industry Macro Industry Code from SDC Platinum 
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Panel B  Macroeconomic Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions Source 
Bank 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of domestic 
currency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims 
on other governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private 
sector, and other banking institutions. 
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
 
Corruption An index from 0 (most) to 6 (least) of perceived corruption in a 
country based on the likelihood of solicited bribes from a country in 
relation to such factors of business as exchange controls, tax 
assessment, and loan protection.   
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
 
Crosslisting A dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the firm has 
stock listed on additional exchanges and a 0 otherwise. 
REUTERS 
 
Domestic 
Credit  
Credit provided by financial institutions, with the exception of credit 
to the central government, scaled by gross domestic product. 
WDI 
 
Domestic 
Credit from 
banks 
Credit provided by monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as 
well as other banking institutions (where data is available), including 
all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of 
credit to the central government, which is net. 
WDI 
 
Fiscal 
Burden 
A score from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) assigned to a country based 
on the level of income tax rates, corporate tax rates, and government 
expenditures as a percent of output. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
 
FPI/GDP Foreign portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting 
foreign authorities' reserves covers transactions in equity 
securities and debt securities. Data are in current U.S. dollars 
and are scaled by gross domestic product. 
WDI 
 
FPI 
Volatility 
The logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 
through t-1. 
WDI; own 
calculation 
 
GDP 
Growth 
GDP per capital growth (%). WDI 
 
Good/Bad 
Times 
Relative measure of confidence in a nation’s solvency based on 
a specific year’s Institutional Investor Rating relative to that 
country’s average rating for the term 1996-2003. 
WDI; own 
calculation 
 
Income An index from 1 (high) to 4 (low)  indicating the level of income in 
the country. 
WDI 
 
Inflation Percentage increase in consumer price levels. WDI 
 
Institutional 
Investor 
Rating 
A rating from 0 (less) to 100 (credit) for each country based on 
their creditworthiness.  This rating is biannual and based on 
surveys of economists and sovereign risk analysts at global 
banks and securities firms. 
Institutional 
Investor; Reinhart, 
Rogoff and 
Savastano, 2003 
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Variable Definitions Source 
Invest A measure from 0 (worst/closed) to 12 (best/open) of the 
government's attitude toward inward investment as determined 
by four components: the risk to operations, taxation, 
repatriation, and labor costs. 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
 
Law An index from 0 (worst) to 6 (best) of law of a nation.  It is two 
measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component 
equals half of the total. The "law" sub-component assesses the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the "order" 
sub-component assesses popular observance of the law. 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
 
Liberaliza-
tion 
A dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if liberalization 
occurred in time t and a 0 otherwise. 
Beckaert, Harvey 
and Lumsdaine 
2002; Henry, 2000 
 
M2/GDP Money or quasi-money scaled by gross domestic product. WDI 
 
Property 
Rights 
A score measuring the efficacy of law in enforcing contracts 
(1- very effective: 5 – very ineffective). 
Heritage 
Foundation 
 
Real Int. 
Rates 
Interest rates adjusted for inflation.   WDI 
 
Savings Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final 
consumption expenditure (total consumption) as a % of GDP. 
WDI 
 
Share A country’s market capitalization divided by the average 
market capitalization of the world. 
WDI; own 
calculation 
 
3Exchange 
Rates 
The annual % change in the official exchange rate as 
determined by national authorities or to the rate determined in 
the legally sanctioned exchange market (annual or averaged 
annually from monthly rates). 
WDI 
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